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ABSTRACT 
Since September 11, 2001, U.S. counter-terror efforts to disrupt al Qaeda’s 
finances have been imprecise at best; at worst, they have had profound negative effects.  
The question of why hawala poses such a great threat and why there is a need for strict 
regulation or elimination of hawala has been the subject of great deliberation among 
policy makers and financial scholars since al Qaeda’s attack on New York and 
Washington, D.C. 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the complexities of the hawala 
informal financial transfer system prevalent in the Middle East and assess its complicity 
with terrorist financing.  To that end, this thesis examines whether the hawala system 
itself poses a significant terrorist threat to the United States as a medium for financial 
transactions for terrorist organizations.  
By conducting a detailed analysis of hawala in Afghanistan from 2001-2006, this 
thesis provides a framework to assess whether the hawala system poses a strategic threat 
in the U.S. led “war on terror.”  Furthermore, by studying regulation attempts in 
Afghanistan, this thesis examines the cultural and economic effects of U.S. efforts on 
Muslims. 
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I. TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES IN THE PURSUIT OF AL 
QAEDA’S FINANCES: IS HAWALA REALLY A STRATEGIC 
THREAT?  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since September 11, 2001, U.S. counter-terror efforts to disrupt al Qaeda’s 
finances have been imprecise at best; at worst, they have had profound negative effects.  
The question of why hawala poses such a great threat and why there is a need for strict 
regulation or elimination of hawala has been the subject of great deliberation among 
policy makers and financial scholars since al Qaeda’s attack on New York and 
Washington, D.C.  Regardless, strategic banter became policy with the publishing of 
Executive Order 13224 which greatly expanded the U.S.’s ability to freeze, block and 
disrupt the transfer and storage of terrorist funds.1  In the aftermath of 9/11, this 
executive order set the tone and direction for U.S. strategy to disrupt and infiltrate al 
Qaeda’s financial network.  EO 13224 created the framework for further debate that 
continues today.  The debate is driven by the underlying assumption of policy makers 
that hawala was a fundamental piece of al Qaeda’s financial repertoire, allowing al 
Qaeda to finance its global operations, particularly the 9/11 attack on America.  This 
assumption is false.  Its roots are in myth and post 9/11 histrionics.  The truth of hawala’s 
bite is seriously lacking the teeth ascribed to it in recent years.  It is in fact a paper tiger. 
B. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
"Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system.  It exists and operates 
outside of, or parallel to 'traditional' banking or financial channels."2  Hawala transfers 
money from one party to another without actually moving it.3  In Arabic, hawala means 
 
1 Department of the Treasury, Contributions by the Department of Treasury to the Financial War on 
Terrorism Fact Sheet, (Washington, D.C: Treasury Department, 2002). 
2 Patrick M. Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu, “The hawala alternative remittance system and its role in 
money laundering,” Interpol, 




                                                
transfer.  Hawala comes from the root Arabic word h-w-l, which means “change” or 
“transform.”  Hawala has been around since 1770.  It first emerged in Calcutta, India 
where no formal financial infrastructure or western banking system existed.  Today, it 
exists as global phenomenon, providing a reliable outlet for financial transfers throughout 
the world, but it is especially prevalent in South Asia and the Middle East.4 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the complexities of the hawala 
informal financial transfer system prevalent in the Middle East and assess its complicity 
with terrorist financing.  To that end, this thesis poses the following primary research 
question: Does the hawala system itself pose a significant terrorist threat to the United 
States as a medium for financial transactions for terrorist organizations?  Secondary 
research questions are: Have regulatory frameworks been effective?  Is it possible to 
create an effective and comprehensive regulatory framework for hawala in formal and 
informal financial sectors?  What obstacles are in the way of an effective policy to reduce 
or eliminate illicit use of the hawala system?  Lastly, what is the cultural and socio-
economic impact in the Muslim world of U.S. financial counter-terrorism strategies for 
curbing illicit use of hawala? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW   
1. Policy Makers’ School 
With the terror attacks of 9/11, there was consensus among government officials 
that combating al Qaeda’s financial network would play a pivotal role.  This spurred 
three bodies of literature, and two primary schools of thought. The most immediate 
school of thought that developed was led by policy makers. The central precept of this 
school of thought emerged quickly: freeze, disrupt, and eliminate anything that touches 
terrorist funds.  President Bush punctuated this effort in his remarks shortly after 





4 Jost and Sandhu. 
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This morning, a major thrust of our war on terrorism began with the stroke 
of a pen. Today, we have launched a strike on the financial foundation of 
the global terror network…we will direct every resource at our command 
to win the war against terrorists: every means of diplomacy, every tool of 
intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial 
influence.  We will starve the terrorists of funding, turn them against each 
other, rout them out of their safe hiding places and bring them to justice.5 
 
Then Secretary of the Treasury echoed the sentiment of the President: 
 
If you have any involvement in the financing of the al-Qaeda organization, 
you have two choices. Cooperate in this fight, or we will freeze your U.S. 
assets. We will punish you for providing the resources that make these evil 
acts possible.  We will succeed in starving the terrorists of funding and 
shutting down the institutions that support or facilitate terrorism.6 
 
 
The central tenet of this school of thought, led by the president, the Treasury 
Department, and other policy makers, is a by-product of the Bush administration’s greater 
“you’re either with us or you’re against us” strategy.  This school has pushed for 
aggressive legislation with broad powers to freeze “terrorist” assets and disrupts its 
financial capabilities.  The fruition of this logic is seen in EO 13224, U.S.A PATRIOT 
ACT, the investigation and prosecution of Islamic charities, the creation of Operation 
Green Quest (an inter-agency task force intended to collaborate the brunt of the U.S. 
financial expertise against financial terror), international collaborative efforts with the 
United Nations and the FATF (Financial Action Task Force), and intense rhetoric on the 
corruption of hawala.  On the heels of the U.S. initiative, FATF responded to 9/11 by 
creating eight special recommendations aimed specifically at combating terrorism 
financing, including one for hawala.7 On October 10, 2001 the FATF issued special 
 
5 George Bush.  Remarks made September 24, 2001, released by the Office of the Press Secretary, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-4.html (accessed April 2007). 
6 Paul O’Neill, Remarks made Regarding the President’s Signing of Executive Order 13324 
Authorizing the Treasury Department to Block Funds of Terrorists and their Associates, released by 
Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, (Washington, DC: 2001), 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po630.htm (accessed March 2007). 
7 Samuel Munzele Maimbo and Nikos Passas, “The Regulation and Supervision of Informal 
Remittance Systems,” Small Enterprise Development 15 (2004): 56. 
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recommendation VI (FATF SP.VI) that called on countries to register or license all 
informal remittance businesses and subject them to all FATF recommendations, whether 
a formal bank or a non-bank.8  The policy makers’ school of thought has at times pursued 
aggressive policy based on ambiguous or inconclusive preliminary data. 
2. Media School 
Another body of literature has been built by numerous commentators with varying 
levels of expertise eager to get published on the hot topic of the day after 9/11: hawala.  
These commentators populate the media9 school of thought on hawala.  Often, this 
school has been found to quickly speak, but not equipped with sound facts.  This is 
evidenced by the widely held belief that terrorism, including al Qaeda, is financed 
through blood diamonds, the source of several sensational books published since 9/11.  
As Passas points out, this has simply been refuted by the 9/11 commission report and 
various law enforcement agencies.10  In several articles in this body of literature, some of 
the prominent names in the media school often repeat hearsay and hypotheses for fact.  
Passas highlights this distinct media trend, showing how five different authors essentially 
quote each other in their claims that al Qaeda uses rough diamonds from Africa to 
finance terror.11  This is indicative of the sort of hyperbole and sensationalism in the 
media school of thought.  Another popular myth of this school, now debunked, is that the 
9/11 hijackers utilized the hawala system to fund and carry out their heinous acts.12  
Hawala is a popular topic in editorial, scholarly, and policy circles.  There has been no 
shortage of those eager to write about hawala, however, often with sloppy scholarship. 
 
8 Maimbo and Passas (2004), 56. 
9 Similar to Passas’ media theory 
10 Nikos Passas, “Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas,” in Terrorism Financing 
and State Response: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2007), 27. 
11 Ibid., 27. 
12 Douglas Greenburg, John Roth,  and Serena Wille, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States: Monograph on Terrorist Financing (Washington, DC: 9/11 Commission, 2004), 
http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf, (accessed May 20007), 
139-40.  
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3. Financial Academia School 
Finally, the most insightful school of thought has been developed within the 
financial circles of academia.  The crux of this school of thought rests in the core belief 
that regulation of hawala needs to be tempered with patience, regional collaboration, 
socio-economic and cultural sensitivity, and broader formal financial reform.  The 
consensus in this group is that efforts to date by the U.S. government and international 
community have been too aggressive and have not achieved their stated objectives.  
Rushing to too quick of recommendations and regulation will not benefit the U.S. in its 
long-term efforts to defeat al Qaeda.  Maimbo and Passas argue that the practice of 
regulation has “preceded comprehensive theoretical debate and empirical research; 
this…may have serious adverse effects.”13  The essential question this school asks is: 
Can counter-terror strategies disrupt the illegal activity without inhibiting the scores of 
people who rely on hawala for legitimate and necessary financial needs?14 
 Another tenet of the scholars’ school of thought is that broader formal financial 
reform will have a more desired effect in reducing hawala misuse than direct external 
pressure and regulation on hawala through registration and licensing.  Most countries 
consider hawala illegal.  Thus, regulation is problematic.  Regulation would implicitly 
recognize IFTs (informal fund transfers) as legitimate.  There is agreement in this school 
of thought, though, that coercive measures will just drive hawala further underground.15  
Looney affirms this assertion explaining that “a crackdown would simply drive them 
(hawalas) underground.”16  Looney argues that if registration and licensing fail to 
achieve the desired effect, then broader economic policies must be considered to make 
 
13 Samuel Munzele Maimbo and Nikos Passas, “The Regulation and Supervision of Informal 
Remittance Systems,” Working Paper, December 10, 2003, http://www.inafi-
la.org/espanol/docu/RegulationandSupervisionInformalRemittanceSystems.pdf (accessed March 2007). 
14 Maimbo and Passas, Small Enterprise Development., 57. 
15 Mohammed El-Qorchi, “Hawala: Based on Trust, Subject to Abuse,” eJournal U.S.A: Economic 
Perspectives (September, 2004),  http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0904/ijee/qorchi.htm (accessed March 
2007). 
16 Robert E. Looney, “Hawala: The Terrorist’s Informal Financial Mechanism,” Middle East Policy, 
10 (2003): 166. 
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vention.”18 
                                                
hawala less attractive.17  Maimbo and Passas agree arguing that broader economic 
reform will have greater effect than swift and  “direct external inter
 Lastly, de Gourde gives voice to an important belief of this school: you must 
account for the socio-economic and cultural effects of any hawala regulation.  He 
describes the “collateral damage” of aggressive seizure of “terrorist” funds by the U.S. in 
the case of al Barakaat, a large hawala firm based out of Somalia.  Hundreds of 
thousands of Somalis relied upon al-Barakaat for financial services, but when their assets 
were frozen after 9/11, Somalis across the board were devastated.  Furthermore, no 
convictions have occurred from this punitive regulatory action.19  Al-Barakaat fulfilled 
many economic services in a vacuum of a formal financial infrastructure in war-torn 
Somalia.  Razavy says the failure of regulation to stop illicit hawala activities “reflects 
the lack of appreciation, on the part of authorities and policy makers, for the broader 
social and cultural context in which hawala operates.”20 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
The three schools of thought all touch on one important theme: the importance of 
terrorist financing.  While all three schools approach the hawala question with different 
lenses and motivations, the clear message is that hawala is worthy of further study, even 
if one can never reach a quantifiable measure of its effect in the al Qaeda financial 
network.  Its importance is unclear, but it seems obvious that there is some vulnerability 
to illicit activity that certainly warrants deeper research.   
 This thesis attempts to contribute to the literature by exploring a simple yet 
overlooked question in all three schools of thought:  Is hawala really that big of a threat?  
Do we need regulation at all?  While most scholars have simply focused on the 
misapplication of regulation and its adverse effects in the broader “war on terror”, this 
work will build upon the scholars’ school of thought and attempt to show that the case for 
 
17 Looney, 167. 
18 Maimbo and Passas, 2003 Working Paper, 3. 
19 Marieke, de Goede, “Hawala Discourses and the War on Terrorist Finance,” Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space, 21 (2003): 525. 
20 Maryam Razavy, “Hawala: An Underground Haven for Terrorists or Social Phenomenon?” Crime, 
Law, and Social Change 44 (2005): 277. 
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al Qaeda’s finances in general are over-stated and certainly hawala in turn, as a threat, is 
oversold.  Succinctly stated, hawala is not a strategic threat in the financial war on terror, 
and furthermore, any heavy-handed attempts to regulate it while have profound negative 
socio-economic and cultural effects on Muslims in the Middle East, alienating the very 
people that the U.S. is counting on to prosecute the “war on terror” and curb “extremist 
Islam.”  In answering the primary research question, this thesis will answer its 
subordinate research questions: has hawala regulation had any effect?  What are the 
cultural and socio-economic implications of current policy? Is it even possible to 
effectively regulate the formal and informal sectors without driving hawala further 
underground? 
E. METHODOLOGY 
 In an attempt to get the best measure of current regulatory frameworks’ 
effectiveness, this author has determined that a comparative case study of Afghanistan 
from 2001-2006 is necessary.  In concluding this thesis, it is useful to identify two other 
Muslim states for further study that are known to have vibrant hawala networks.  To this 
purpose, the U.A.E. and Pakistan section of the conclusion provides a brief glimpse at 
two different approaches to hawala after a more lengthy and exhaustive examination of 
Afghanistan.  U.A.E. has been heavily targeted by the U.S. and international community 
post-9/11 to curb the abuse of hawala for illicit purposes.  It is widely accepted that 
U.A.E. has one of the largest hawala systems in the world, largely due to its enormous 
expatriate population.  U.A.E. is also an interesting case study, because it is the first state 
to proudly volunteer to regulate hawala and ensure it is not “against us.” The Central 
Bank of U.A.E. has enacted numerous reforms aimed at deterring illicit hawala activity.  
Consequently, U.A.E. seems a logical state to examine in attempting to answer my 
primary research question. Pakistan too has heavy hawala traffic.  Contrary to U.A.E., 
Pakistan has been less forthcoming in acknowledging hawala’s prominence in its state.  
Nonetheless, it is a prominent Islamic state filled with tribal networks and allegedly a 
high terrorist density in its remote regions.  That makes Pakistan’s hawala network ideal 
to study, if only briefly. 
 8
 Finally, the focus of this thesis is on Afghanistan which is another prominent 
Islamic state and since 9/11 is the most germane state to the U.S. led “war on terror.”  In 
a unique evolvement of the hawala system, Afghanistan, primarily in Kabul, has a small 
network of self-regulated hawaladars.  This unique iteration gives a completely different 
look to U.S. counter-terror strategies.  Additionally, Afghanistan, like its eastern 
neighbor, is generally agreed to be a nexus of terror suspects and a hot spot in the U.S. 
led “war on terror.”  Therefore, it is logical that if hawala is being manipulated for illicit 
purposes, Afghanistan’s hawala network would make a great case study to examine 
through the lens of the primary and secondary research questions. 
 By conducting a detailed analysis of hawala in Afghanistan from 2001-2006 and 
in a few words comparing it to Pakistan and the U.A.E., this thesis attempts to prove its 
primary hypothesis to be true: hawala as a component the war on financial terror is not a 
strategic threat.  Furthermore, this thesis attempts to show that any broad regulation has 
been non-effective, and in fact counter-productive, alienating scores of innocent Muslims 
and galvanizing regional support away from U.S. foreign policy while pushing Muslim 
sympathies toward al Qaeda.  The incongruence of American foreign policy in the 
financial “war on terror” has been damaging.  America has extended the olive branch to 











                                                
II. UNVEILING HAWALA  
A. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In Arabic, “hawala” means “transfer.”  In a larger sense, it is often associated with 
any money exchange system that operates outside of a formal financial sector.  The 
hawala system typically involves the transmission of remittances from one country to 
another through an intermediary, called a hawaladar.  Some have labeled hawala an 
“underground” system.  This is false, as most hawaladars operate openly, advertising 
publicly and serving legitimate needs of their customers.21  Another prevalent label for 
hawala is that of an “alternative remittance system.”  This label is misleading because it 
obscures the fact that in many areas hawala is the only available financial system.22  
Afghanistan and Somalia are but two examples of states where reliable financial 
mechanism are so scarce, even aid organizations use hawala.  Sifting through the 
literature, Passas introduced the most widely accepted term that encompasses hawala 
operations: informal value transfer systems (IVTS).  Passas defines IVTS as 
“mechanisms or networks of people facilitating the transfer of funds or value without 
leaving a trail of entire transactions taking place outside the traditionally regulated 
financial systems.”23  The crux of the hawala system is simple, though: trust. It is 
hawala’s “defining characteristic.”24 
In laying the strategic framework for further study of hawala, Maimbo, el Qorchi 
et al drew an important distinction between two types of IVTS.  Maimbo et al separate 
Informal Fund Transfer Systems (IFTS) or (IFT) from a transfer of pure value.  
Somewhere in between the two spectrums is the Informal Value Transfer Methods 
(IVTM).25  Essentially, IFTs are well established and known in their communities.  They 
 
21 Jost and Sandhu. 
22 Nikos Passas, “Demystifying Hawala: A Look into its Social Organization and Mechanics” Journal 
of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 7 (2006): 48. 
23 Ibid., 48. 
24 Maimbo and Passas, 2003 Working Paper, 4. 
25 Passas, 48. 
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deal purely in financial assets.  In contrast, IVTM transfer money and other values.  Its 
most important connotation, though, is one of illicit activity.26  IVTM routinely mask 
illicit activity with the transfer of seemingly innocuous or otherwise routine commercial 
transactions of goods or services. 
B. HISTORICAL ROOTS 
IFT systems developed along historic trade routes because of the inherent danger 
of carrying large sums of money and gold along routes besieged with bandits and 
thieves.27  Despite their different names—(fei-ch’ien (China), hui kuan (Hong Kong), 
hundi (India), hawala (Middle East), padala (Phillipines), and phei kwan (Thailand), the 
development of IFT systems remains similarly entrenched in the need to secure financial 
transactions over great distances.28  These IFT systems allowed money or gold to be 
transferred from one party to another without physically moving the funds.  This 
provided safety and assurance to the customer that his transaction would occur without 
external disruption from robbers along the trade routes. 
In China, IFT systems can be traced to the Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD).  As 
China’s economy boomed, there arose a severe need for a financial system that would 
allow workers to send taxes, pay and other funds.  The creation of the fei-ch’ien (which 
means flying money, literally, flying coins) met this demand.29  This remittance system 
continued in China through the Ming and Ch’ing dynasties.  Another catalyst in China 
was the cotton trade, whose need for fund transfers effectively made fei-ch’ien a China-
wide system.30 
 
26 Passas (2006), 48. 
27 Mohammed El-Qorchi, “Hawala: How does this Informal Funds Transfer System Work, and Should 
it be Regulated?” Finance & Development 39 (2002): 31. 
28 Mohammed El-Qorchi, Samuel Munzele Maimbo, and John F. Wilson, Informal Funds Transfer 
Systems: An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System, (Washington D.C.: IMF, 2003): 10. 
29 Ibid., 10. 
30 Ibid., 10. 
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On the India sub-continent, hundi developed before there were available western 
banking systems.31  Jost explains hundi in context to India’s banking system.  He writes: 
 
The first western bank in India was the Bank of Hindustan, established in 
Calcutta around 1770.  Prior to this, the operations of sarafs and potedars, 
who were primarily moneychangers (and essentially the predecessors of 
hawaladars) were a fundamental component of the commercial and 
financial infrastructures.32   
 
 
Hundi is extremely old and pre-dates modern banking.  As El-Qorchi et al explain, hundi 
has “been in vogue in India from time immemorial.”33  Only recently has hundi become 
illegal. 
 In the Middle East, hawala has facilitated trade between those in one region, but 
also between regions and fiefdoms.  There are some historical accounts of hawala 
practices being widespread centuries ago.  Hawala instruments were referred to as 
attalaa.  Attalaa was a bill that a debtor wrote his name on and sealed, which protected 
the intermediary in moving between regions.34  The exact roots of hawala in the Middle 
East are unknown.  Historical records that reference hawala are spotty at best.  What is 
known with certainty is its vital importance as a financial mechanism today, largely due 
to the ever-growing expatriate population living throughout the Middle East. 
C. MECHANICS AND OPERATION 
The essential idea of hawala is to transfer money without physically transporting 
funds. The immediate fear of difficulty for law enforcement agencies, intelligence 
agencies, and counter-terror strategists is obvious: there is little or no paper trail.35  
However, it should be noted that transferring money without physically moving it is not 
an exclusive attribute of hawala.  In this regard, hawala is similar to a myriad of other 
 
31 Jost and Sandhu. 
32 Jost and Sandhu. 
33 El-Qorchi, et al, 11. 
34 Ibid., 11. 
35 Jost and Sandhu. 
wire transfer and options available in the formal financial sector.36  One of its defining 
characteristics, though, is that there is simply no easy way to track the hawala process.  
Additionally, the mixing of legitimate and illegitimate hawala transactions makes the 
trail of hawala very complicated and very hard to disentangle legitimate from illegitimate 
activity.37  There is no simple wire transfer that can be easily traced and monitored.  
Hawala activity, both illicit and licit, is generally layered and therefore all the more 
difficult to trace.38  From a counter-terror standpoint, it’s a daunting task from the start 
with no easy roads to follow. 
 
Figure 1. A Basic Hawala Transaction. (From: Nikos Passas) 
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36 Nikos Passas, “Law Enforcement Challenges in Hawala-related Investigations,” Journal of 
Financial Crime 12 (2004): 112. 
37 Passas (2004), 112. 
38 Ibid., 112. 
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In its simplest mechanical form, hawala has four parties: a customer, an 
intermediary (hawaladar), a hawaladar in another region or state, and the recipient of 
funds.  A typical hawala transaction will involve an expatriate remittance.39  For 
example, a young worker in the U.A.E. may wish to send his pay, or a portion of it, back 
to his family in Afghanistan.  The worker contacts a hawaladar in Dubai, U.A.E..  The 
hawaladar arranges the transfer by calling a hawaladar in Kabul, Afghanistan with 
whom he has done business with previously, and probably already has a close working 
relationship. The customer may pay in one currency, while the hawaladar in Kabul pays 
his family in the local currency.  Often, hawala networks are marked by network and 
family connections.  This is absolutely necessary for hawala to work so efficiently on 
such a large-scale regional basis.40  “The closer are the relationships among hawaladars, 
the easier becomes the settlement process.”41 
Since hawala transactions involve large amounts of cash, and the funds do not 
physically move from the customer in Country A to the recipient in country B, then there 
must be large amounts of cash at each end of a hawala transaction.42  This cash pool is a 
critical element of the hawala system and ultimately is what allows hawala to thrive.  
The trust that a fellow hawaladar will fulfill his end of a transaction with ready cash is 
critical to the fulfillment of a hawala promise, and to the professional reputation of each 
hawaladar involved.  Cash makes the hawala system work. 
D. ATTRACTIVENESS OF HAWALA 
1. Speed and Efficiency 
The appeal of hawala seems intuitive.  It is cheap, efficient, reliable, quick, and in 
most cases, simply the best if not only option available for financial transactions.  
Hawaladars may only charge a commission from 0.25% - 1.5% to cover any fluctuations 
 
39 Looney, 165. 
40 Looney, 165. 
41 Passas (2006), 52. 
42 Ibid., 52. 
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in currency that may occur during the transaction period.43  Hawaladars exploit the 
natural fluctuations in demand for different currencies and offer substantially better deals 
than formal banks can.  They do not make their profit off fees like a formal bank does.  
Therefore the cost savings for the consumer is significant, in some cases 12-19%.44 
Hawala has no bureaucratic tangle that one might find in the formal financial 
sector.  There, a fund request is made, and the banking system takes days and weeks to 
process the request on the other end.  Hawala transactions are stream-lined; the method 
of hawaladars may be cell-phone, email, fax or other real-time devices such as 
blackberries.  The result is that the process time is significantly reduced over the formal 
sector.  In a short period of time, usually within twenty-four hours, the recipient in 
another region or state is in possession of the funds that the customers desired to be 
transferred, no matter how remote the location.  This simple management structure allows 
for swift transactions that make hawala extremely appealing in comparison to suspect or 
non-existent formal mechanisms.45  In some cases where hawala transactions occur 
between major international cities, the speed of hawala may increase to only six to 
twelve hours.46 
2. Limited Options for Remittances and Aid 
For many in the Middle East and throughout the Muslim world, hawala is the 
only viable option for worker remittances.  With the vast numbers of petro-dollars and 
petro-jobs, as well as other service related jobs created because of the oil boom in the 
Middle East, hawala is used extensively by expatriates to send home their wages.  The 
convenience is too great.  It is cheap, and it is widely available, no matter where you are, 
or no matter where you desire to send money.   Additionally, hawaladars, unlike formal 
financial systems, are accessible twenty-four hours a day.   
 
43 Passas (2006),  57. 
44 Jost and Sandhu. 
45 El-Qorchi, e-Journal U.S.A. 
46 El Qorchi et al (2003), 7. 
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 Another legitimate use of hawala is humanitarian relief and aid.  Humanitarian 
organizations find hawala attractive because of the absent or entirely unreliable financial 
infrastructure existing in the war-ravaged countries that they are most likely to be 
operating.47  This has been the case in Afghanistan and Somalia in particular.  In these 
two countries, there is literally no other option.  Hawala has served as a mostly reliable 
albeit necessary conduit for the transfer of relief fund into these decimated regions. 
3. Cultural and Ethnic Factors 
Hawala is also attractive because of many non-economic factors.  “The kinship, 
ethnic ties, and personal elations between hawaladars and expatriate workers make this 
system convenient and easy to use.”48  Customers often know the hawaladars personally.  
They are friends and neighbors.  They share the same ethnic roots.  They trust one 
another.  Because of these close ties, hawaladars often make deals with customers to 
sweeten the attraction of their hawala services.  For example, hawaladars often 
accommodate their clients by instructing their counterparts to pay the recipient before the 
expatriate has even paid the hawaladar.49  It is a trust-based system.  This type of 
extraordinary commitment on the part of the hawaladar makes the hawala system look 
too good to use another formal mechanism for remittances. 
 Cultural considerations also make hawala appear the best financial choice for any 
fund transfer.  Since most expatriate communities are entirely male, this can create great 
difficulty on the receiving end of a remittance, where many states have social norms that 
preclude women from formal interaction with banks or other public services.  In the case 
of hawala, hawaladars in the receiving country are known in the local or tribal regions, 
trusted, and sensitive to the cultural norms of a society.  Hawaladars are acceptable 
intermediaries that allow women to successfully receive remittance wages from their 
family members abroad.50  Hawala’s intimate intertwining with its clients’ society and 
 
47 El Qorchi et al (2003), 12. 
48 El Qorchi (2002), 32. 
49 Ibid., 32. 
50 Ibid., 33. 
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culture make it uniquely positioned to most effectively meet the transfer needs of most in 
the Middle East and Muslim society at large. 
 Hawala is going to thrive in the Muslim world with areas that lack or have 
reduced financial infrastructure.  This is the case in much of the Middle East, especially 
in states the United States is targeting in its counter-terror efforts like Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.  The more instable the situation on the ground is, the greater the state’s 
proclivity for hawala will be.  Slowed or repressed economic development will drive 
people to seek out other informal and more reliable fund transfer mechanisms such as 
hawala.51  Hawala exists as a viable option for many in most countries around the world.  
However, especially in the absence of any reliable formal mechanism for remittances or 
fund transfers, hawala continues to thrive. 
4. Criminal Elements 
Expatriates and workers in the Middle East are not the only ones who find hawala 
attractive.  Criminal elements find hawala a useful tool for many reasons too.  For 
reasons already stated, hawala provides great cover to illicit activity.  There’s little 
accountability, many claim there is shoddy or non-existing book-keeping by hawaladars 
and since it is a trust-based system, generally not too many questions are asked.  It should 
be noted, however, that the record-keeping of hawaladars in Afghanistan has been found 
by several analysts to be meticulous and copious, completely refuting the suggestions of 
many that hawaladars do not keep accurate books.  This is explained further in the case 










51 El Qorchi et al (2003), 33. 
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Passas highlights the advantages of hawala to the criminal or terrorist: 
 
 
Hawala can hide criminal activity; legitimate financial and commercial 
activities can shield hawala operations; both of these can be obscured by 
‘benami’ (false name) or nominee relationships; another layer of difficulty 
is added when transactions involve the use of more advanced technology 
(the internet) or funds go through ‘correspondent’ and ‘pass through’ 
accounts; additional layers of difficulty develop when such transactions go 
through national jurisdictions without transparency-enhancing bank 
secrecy laws, adequate money laundering legislation or effective 
enforcement; given that the settlement process in many IVTS transactions 
involved the trade I good and various commodities or smuggling, a further  
hurdle is raised when transactions pass through jurisdictions with porous 
borders or cash-based economics.52 
  
Hawala provides a plethora of loopholes and safety nets for those who would care 
to use hawala for illicit purposes.  Because of its inherent traits, hawala makes disruption 
of such abuses extremely difficult and therefore all the more alluring to criminal 
elements. 
5. Anonymity 
Lastly, the anonymity of hawala transactions makes the hawala system attractive 
to both legitimate users and those who would use it to mask illicit criminal or terror-
related activities.  There is virtually no documentation required at any stage of a hawala 
transaction.  No customer identification is required or needed except for a code that is 
used to mark the transaction and required in most instances for the recipient to claim the 
funds transferred.  At best, customer identification is voluntary.  If there are any 
documents pertaining to a hawala transaction, they are typically destroyed after the 
transaction is executed.53  Again, it should be noted that this is the consensus of most 
hawala experts, but specifically in Afghanistan at least, hawaladars have been found to 
keep extremely detailed records of clients and transactions going back decades.  There is 
warmth in anonymity that comforts legitimate users of hawala who are distrustful of 
 
52 Nikos Passas (2004), 112. 
53 El Qorchi, et al (2003), 9. 
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formal state mechanisms as well as for criminals who simply do not want their illegal 
activities to be monitored or disrupted.  El Qorchi et al demonstrate the potential for 
abuse by terrorists: 
 
 
Figure 2. Possible Terrorist Hawala Transaction.   (After: World Bank and 
IMF) 
E. MAKING MONEY: WHAT’S IN IT FOR THE HAWALADAR 
One of the reasons why hawala is so attractive to potential customers is because it 
is cheap.  The reason it is so cheap is because of the low-overhead costs associated with 
hawala transactions.  Hawaladars may operate from a rented storefront shared with 
another business down or from a modest table set up in a tea shop.54  There is very little 
cost associated with the minimum necessities to conduct hawala transactions.  In reality, 
all a hawaladar needs is a reliable phone or maybe a computer with internet access.  A 
hawaladar can literally operate from anywhere with little or no incurred costs above the 
cost of any legal business the hawaladar might also be conducting.  The average direct 
cost for a hawala transactions between major international centers such as Dubai and 
New York is between two and five percent.55 
 
54 Jost and Sandhu. 
55 El Qorchi, et al (2003), 7. 
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Hawaladars operate to make a profit.  They offer a phenomenal deal to locals and 
expatriates, but their motives are not purely to play to cultural sensitivities.  They want to 
make money.  To this end, hawaladars buy and sell different currencies.  Each 
hawaladar attempts to profit by “buying a currency at a lower rate than he sells it for.”56  
The profits are at the margins of the hawala system.  Hawaladars simply have to beat the 
prices they use to turn a profit.  This is the bottom line: hawaladars profit to the extent 
that they can win the bargaining war within the hawala system and get a better currency 
price from other hawaladars.57   
Though hawaladars are maximizing profits through direct bargaining with one 
another for the best price, the hawala system is generally profitable compared to the 
formal financial sector because of the difference between official and unofficial exchange 
rates.  The wider the margin between official currency rates and the informal hawala 
currency rates, the greater potential for profit by hawaladars who can pass on greater 
savings to the customer.58  Through exploitation of exchange rates, selling cash, 
commissions and fees, trade financing, and recruitment of clients for legal businesses by 
virtue of hawala’s inherent benefits, hawala proves to be a very profitable mechanism.   
F. THE EXTENT OF HAWALA 
The extent of hawala remains unclear due to the lack of accountability and long-
term records, or at least the accessibility of hawaladars’ records.  Hawaladars appear to 
only be limited by the amount of cash they are willing to carry or the amount the 
executing hawaladar has on hand to cover a transaction.59  While the predominance of 
usage of hawala is in South Asia and the Middle East, the system has global capacity.  




56 Passas (2006), 56. 
57 Ibid., 57. 
58 Ibid., 57. 
59 Looney, 165. 
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London, and especially in the Middle East.  Perhaps the hawala epicenter in the Middle 
East is Dubai, United Arab Emirates.  U.A.E.’s substantial hawala sector is generally 
attributed to its robust expatriate population. 
Even if there is no quantifiable measurement of hawala due to its informal nature, 
there is every reason to believe it is an expansive network with millions flowing through 
it.  Pakistan, while refusing to admit the hawala system’s legality or legitimacy, has 
estimated the amount of money in its hawala system at more than $5 billion per year, 
constituting Pakistan’s largest source of foreign currency.  Most of this is expatriate 
remittances from Pakistanis abroad back to their families.  It is also believed that 
Pakistanis may have overseas holdings roughly equal to Pakistan’s gross domestic 
product.60  India also has a huge hawala presence.  Interpol places India’s hawala at 
approximately 40% of its GDP.  At the turn of the century, this was roughly the size of 
Canada’s economy.61 
G. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 
The hawala system has profound economic impact on every state in which it 
exists.  Neither end of the hawala transaction knows exactly what the status of financial 
assets is for his country.  Increased assets for the receiving country and liabilities for the 
sending state are unaccounted for.  “Value changes hands, but broad money is 
unaltered.”62  The reality, though, is that broad money often is affected by hawala 
transactions in the receiving countries.  Additionally, hawala transactions are usually 
marked by the use of cash in payment.  The net result is that hawala transactions tend to 
flood recipient countries in cash that is not officially accounted for in economic 
measurement or planning.63   
 
60 Looney, 166. 
61 Scott Baldauf, “The War on Terror’s Money-India’s Six Month Investigation Offers Lessons on 
Fighting Underground Banking,” Christian Science Monitor, July 22, 2002. 
62 El-Qorchi (2002), 33. 
63 Ibid., 33. 
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 III. MISTRUST AND REFORM:  AN ANALYSIS OF HAWALA IN 
AFGHANISTAN                                          
A. INTRODUCTION: FUNDAMENTALISM REBORN 
In May 2003, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested that 
the war in Afghanistan was in a “cleanup” phase.  Now, four years after 
Rumsfeld’s statement and five and a half years since the conclusion of 
major Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) combat operations, it is clear 
that Afghanistan is anything but a stable and secure country.  Indeed, the 
situation in Afghanistan has become extremely volatile.64 
 
 
Before the thick cloud of dust and debris had begun to dissipate at Ground Zero, 
Afghanistan, a state that had largely been forgotten since the last Soviet retreated back 
across its border in 1989 became the center of attention in a massive, worldwide 
collaboration.  Led by the United States, this conglomerate was intent on striking back at 
bin Laden and his al Qaeda network that had worked, plotted, and trained unimpeded and 
largely un-noticed by the rest of the world in the remote regions of Afghanistan until the 
morning of September 11, 2001. In the metaphorical Global War on Terror being waged 
by the United States, the importance of Afghanistan cannot be overstated.65   
Afghanistan’s role in facilitating the financing of terror cannot be overstated, 
either.  But while focusing on the financial underpinnings of al Qaeda’s terror network, it 
is nonetheless imperative to understand the context in which any abuse of hawala or 
terror financing occurred in the first place.  Afghanistan produced a global Salafist 
movement led by a battle-hardened cadre of Arabs who fought there against the super-
power Soviets.  This movement captivated much of the Muslim world.  Saudi Arabia 
began contributing to the movement financially and this gradually began to spawn much 
more interest in fundamentalist organizations on the ground in Afghanistan and 
 
64 Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan,” 
China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 5 (2007): 93. 
65 Thomas H. Johnson, “The Origins and Financing of Afghan Terrorism: Thugs, Guns, Drugs, 
Interlopers and Creative Movements of Money,” DRAFT for Terrorism Financing and State Response: A 
Comparative Perspective, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2007), 1. 
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throughout the region.  As volunteers began to show up to fight against the Soviets their 
ideas cross-fertilized.  Thousands began to show up; Saudi Arabia was happy to pay for 
one-way tickets for their internal radical groups to leave and fight another enemy. 
 
The Arab Afghans were often unwanted renegades in their own 
countries…These abandoned idealists were naturally looking for a leader.  
They had little to cling to except their cause and each other…They saw 
themselves as a borderless posse empowered by God to defend the entire 
Muslim people.  This was exactly bin Laden’s dream.66   
 
The result of bin Laden and the Arab jihadists in Afghanistan is that they became 
highly radicalized in an under-governed Afghanistan.  Left to their own vices, they were 
free to raise funds, move money through the informal sector, plan, and exploit the non-
existent regulatory oversight.  They were not thinkers, but doers, and took a bare-
knuckles approach that spawned al Qaeda later.67   
Afghanistan provided free space for training and building an Al Qaeda army.  It 
allowed a nebulous movement like al Qaeda to build financial capacity and operational 
expertise.  The devastating results of America’s own involvement in the anti-Soviet jihad 
came back to haunt the U.S. twelve years later as this once harmless band of jihadists, 
now fully-funded and doctrinally strong, turned its ire to the West.  From the shadows of 
Afghanistan, they struck a devastating blow to another superpower.  How did al Qaeda 
fund its terrorist activities?  A further look at hawala reveals the form and methodology 
of terror financing in Afghanistan used by al Qaeda, the Taliban, drug runners and others 
who have undoubtedly manipulated the informal sector with impunity. 
B. FINANCIAL TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN:  BACKGROUND ISSUES  
There are four primary financial underpinnings to Afghanistan-based terrorism: 
assistance from sympathetic states (including the U.S. during the anti-Soviet jihad), Arab 
 
66 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2006), 105-106. 
67 Vali Nasr, Remarks at the Naval Postgraduate School, May 21, 2007. 
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contributions and abuse of the zakat68, narcotics and drug trafficking, and hawala.69  
While all four financial vehicles are important and worthy of further analysis, pursuant to 
the objectives of this thesis, consider for now the role of hawala in Afghanistan.  
Through a thorough analysis of the hawala system and how illicit funds enter the 
network, policy makers will be better able to understand its intricate workings and curb 
illicit abuse by terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda. 
Hawala in Afghanistan has always played an important role in the financial 
sector, but especially in recent decades.  “After more than 20 years of conflict in the 
country, Afghanistan’s formal financial sector is virtually non-existent.  The conflict has 
resulted in the complete disruption of domestic and international payment systems, the 
virtual cessation of all lending activities within the country, significantly reduced deposit 
taking activities, and a stoppage of most international banking relationships.”  Maimbo 
adds: “The disruption to the provision of financial services was most acute during the 
reign of the Taliban government when Afghanistan was subjected to international 
sanctions.”70  During this period of turmoil, hawala filled a necessary role left void 
because of the financial sector’s inability to meet the most basic financial service needs 
of the Afghan people.   
Until the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the informal sector, namely hawala, was the 
only reliable service in play.  While formal financial institutions were non-existent or 
incapacitated by sanctions and war, hawala provided a cheap, efficient, and cost-effective 
alternative that could be trusted by the Afghan people.71  In the absence of an 
internationally recognized and legitimate government, the informal hawala sector’s 
 
68 One of the five pillars of Islam.  It is an annual alms tax or tithe of 2.5% levied on wealth and 
distributed to the poor.  It is a manifestation of the fact all faithful Muslims are duty-bound to attend to the 
social welfare of their community by redressing economic inequalities through payment of an alms tax. 
John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 90. 
69 Johnson DRAFT, 24. 
70 Samuel M. Maimbo, “The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Hawala System in 
Afghanistan”, World Bank Working Paper No. 13, 2003. 
71 Maimbo (2003), 1. 
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hawaladars, or money service providers, became “key economic agents”72 in 
Afghanistan.  Even as the formal financial sector has seen growth and improvement since 
2001, the hawala network remains a central cog in the financial networks of Afghanistan. 
C. MAPPING HAWALA: THE SCOPE AND EXTENT OF AFGHANISTAN’S 
HAWALA SYSTEM  
1. Size 
The magnitude of hawala’s footprint in Afghanistan is colossal.  The World Bank 
estimates that a whopping 80-90% of all economic activity in Afghanistan is in the 
informal sector.73  With hawala dominating the financial world of Afghanistan, it seems 
rather intuitive that illicit funds from drugs and terrorism are present in the system.  Such 
cultural precision, though, seemed lost on policy makers in the U.S. government who 
settled on a more heavy-handed approach to hawala after 9/11.74  Al Qaeda used hawala 
for the same reasons that hundreds of NGOs and international aid organizations did.  
There was no alternative.  “Al Qaeda moved much of its money by hawala before 9/11.  
In some ways, al Qaeda had no choice after its move to Afghanistan in 1996; the banking 
system there was antiquated and undependable.”75 
Surprisingly, with 80-90% of the entire Afghan economy generated from one 
sector, there are only a few hundred hawaladars that operate the entire hawala network. 
There have been two significant studies that help us sketch the size and numbers of the 
hawaladars and hawala markets in Afghanistan.  Maimbo’s seminal effort to hawala 
literature that focuses on the money dealers of Kabul estimates that there are 300 
registered hawaladars in Kabul and 500-2000 total throughout Afghanistan.76  Edwina 
Thompson, in her cogent contribution to the study of the opium problem in Afghanistan, 
 
72 Edwina A. Thompson, “The Nexus of Drug Trafficking and Hawala in Afghanistan,” in 
Afghanistan’s Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics and Implications for Counter Narcotics 
Policy, ed. Doris Buddenberg and William A. Byrd (Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2006), 155. 
73 Ibid., 155. 
74 This will be addressed specifically in a later section of this chapter. 
75 Greenburg et al, 25. 
76 Maimbo (2003), 3. 
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places the number of significant shops in the country at 900.77  Finally, based off 2004 
interviews conducted in Afghanistan by the Treasury Department, the number of 
hawaladars is estimated to be slightly over 300 in the Kabul Money Exchange, and 
potentially 100-300 additional dealers scattered in each region to service each of 
Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces.78  Whatever the exact number, it is clear that a 
relatively few hawaladars control a vast and powerful financial network. 
2. Volume 
The amount of money flowing through the hawala network is tremendous.  
Maimbo elaborates:  
 
Since the fall of the Taliban regime, the volume of financial flows through 
the hawala system has grown significantly.  NGOs alone are estimated to 
have channeled at least U.S. $200 million in emergency, relief, and 
development funding through the hawala system.79   
 
 
While typical international transactions are in the U.S. $100,000 - $200,000 
range, single transactions between major financial centers such as Kabul and Peshawar in 
excess of U.S. $500,000, or even U.S. $1,000,000 transactions by international 
organizations are not unusual.  However, internal transactions tend to be in the U.S. 
$10,000 – $20,000 range.80 
 The overall volume of money in the hawala market in Afghanistan is difficult to 
determine with any certainty.  Due to the informal nature and general secrecy of hawala, 
“any estimate of the overall size of the hawala market in Afghanistan should however be 
 
77 Thompson, 156. 
78 These figures were based on conversations by Treasury officials with Afghans staffed in the 
Supervision Department of the Central Bank as well as with several Money Exchange Dealers in the Kabul 
Hawala market. 
79 Maimbo, 4. 
80 Ibid., 4. 
viewed with extreme caution.”81  Nonetheless, Thompson provides a healthy estimate of 
what hawala flows look like in Afghanistan.82 
 
 
Table 1. Estimates of Afghanistan’s 2004-2005 Aggregate Hawala Flows 
(From: Thompson) 
Hawala, while informal, finances and moves billions of dollars in and out of Afghanistan.  
It is an impressive feat considering the system relies solely on good business practices 
and self-regulation among its hawaladars. 
3. Afghan-Specific Hawala Traits  
Aside from the fact that hawala in many cases is the only choice available in 
Afghanistan, like in other regions, it also maintains its appeal as an extremely fast, 
                                                 
81 Thompson, 160. 
82 Ibid., 160. 
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reliable, and affordable means to conduct a financial remittance or transaction.  
International transfers from Kabul to major financial centers such as London, Peshawar, 
New York, or Dubai typically only take six to twelve hours.  This time can be reduced if 
hawaladars are standing by to receive the money the instant it is sent or ordered.83  
Another universal attribute of hawala clearly evident in Afghanistan is its affordability.  
Typical costs for a hawala transaction in Afghanistan or neighboring regions is one to 
two percent.84  Coupled with the speed and absence of alternatives, hawala has long been 
the method of choice for money service needs in Afghanistan. 
4. Hawala Myths 
 One of the more populated myths in the barrage of post 9/11 hysteria and media 
scrutiny of hawala is the reported fact that hawala transactions are paperless, with 
hawaladars keeping little if any record of transactions, or certainly not beyond the time 
frame for that transaction to be completed and all funds received by all parties involved. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, hawaladars’ record-keeping and accounting activities 
appear amazingly robust and professional.  Hawaladars are careful to take note of 
currencies traded, international pricing of currencies, deposit balances, debit and credit 
balances of partner dealers and all customers, all lending transactions, cash on hand, all 
foreign exchange positions, and customer receipts.85  Though only anecdotal, one 
investigator offered further evidence of the meticulous record-keeping when he noted that 
after striking a rapport with a hawaladar in the Kabul Exchange, the dealer opened his 






83 Maimbo (2003), 5. 
84 Ibid., 5. 
85 Amit Sharma, Remarks given at the Naval Postgraduate School July 31, 2007.  Sharma works for 
the Department of Treasury as the Senior Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury and has 
previously conducted analysis of hawala while working in the Office of Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence. 
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Maimbo confirms the findings of the TFI investigator:   
 
The study found that some dealers maintain detailed records for each 
hawala transaction for purposes of remittance and settlement.  Dealers 
know exactly how much cash they have, how much has been transferred, 
and how much is owed them.  During the research, the money exchange 
dealers routinely provided the following documents in varying 
combinations: hawala slips, customer identification documents and 
records, and accounting records.86 
  
Thompson, too, contradicts the widespread belief that hawala is a paperless 
system.  “Access to financial records reveals that that each transaction is carefully 
logged, and follows its own accounting procedures.”  She continues to explain that “one 
hawaladar confided that he documents all of the shop’s drug-related financial transfers 
on his son’s computer at home.”   
This last point is interesting on two accounts.  First, it reaffirms the position of 
this thesis that hawala is not paperless, and in fact, hawaladars keep meticulous records 
over long periods of time.  They follow normal good business accounting principles.  
Secondly, and most interestingly, one might infer that if a hawaladar keeps such detailed 
and comprehensive records so as to even have records of transactions involving drug 
money, it certainly seems plausible, though perhaps academically unverifiable, that 
hawaladars might keep similar records on transactions that they know involve terrorist 
funds or money designated for insurgent operations.  It provides an interesting research 
question worthy of further investigation by others with more funding and time for field 
research than is afforded this author.  But given that the vast percentage of the 
Afghanistan’s market is informal, or in hawala, it seems likely that some percentage of 
the volume, though perhaps not as much as the drug volume in hawala, is terrorist-
related.  There may be records kept on these transactions, though they are probably 
handled even more discreetly than drug transactions on a home computer. 
 
86 Maimbo (2003), 7. 
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5. International Organizations87 
 Due to the lack of formal financial institutions and the unreliability of those in 
place, hawala was during the war-torn Taliban years as it is today, the favorite method of 
delivery of funds for international aid organizations and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).  The formal sector provides little options, and aside from carrying small sums of 
cash for basic operating costs, international organizations are forced to use hawala to 
send more substantial amounts of money.  It is the only viable option.88  Under the 
Taliban, international users had one or two designated hawaladars that they could deal 
with, but now, there is great competition between many hawaladars offering more 
competitive, cheaper, and highly reliable financial services into and out of Afghanistan.89 
As of 2003, there were 127 international and 467 local NGOs operating in Afghanistan.  
It is estimated that in excess of U.S. $200 million was sent through the hawala system in 
the first year after the Taliban government collapsed.  Furthermore, in the more rural 
areas where much of the aid money is desperately needed there is literally no 
alternative.90  Banks are completely absent.  There are some formal banks that solicit 
business from NGOs, but the turn-off for NGOs and hawaladars that have to deal with 
them is that they are “laboriously slow.”91  Ultimately, the premium advantage of hawala  
over any formal financial entity is its long-stretch (it can reach the most rural areas of 
Afghanistan) and the fact that it “provides NGOs with liquidity they otherwise might not 
have.”92 
 
87 For a more detailed description and examples of typical NGO/international aid organization 
transactions through hawala, see Maimbo’s 2003 study full report. 
88 Maimbo, 11. 
89 Ibid., 11. 
90 Ibid., 13. 
91 Ibid., 13. 
92 Ibid., 13. 
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D. THE AFGHAN FORMAL FINANCIAL SECTOR 
1. Mapping the Formal Financial Sector 
Afghanistan’s formal financial sector reflects a weak history.  During the 
Taliban’s rule, only six licensed banks existed providing no commercial services nor did 
they have the ability to facilitate international remittances.93  Since the fall of the Taliban 
regime, more formal financial institutions are forming in Afghanistan, but are still lacking 
in most facets of service.  “Like everything else in Afghanistan, the formal financial 
services are underdeveloped.”94  As of October 2005, there were 13 licensed banks open 
for business in Kabul.95  New banks such as National Bank of Pakistan, Habib Bank, and 
Punjab National Bank of India are all conducing business in Afghanistan now.  Despite 
the slow emergence of major international and regional banks, the banking system “is 
best described as embryonic.”96   Years of conflict decimated the functionality of 
Afghanistan’s formal banking services.   
 
Because of the war, the financial sector came to an almost complete 
standstill.  The country’s banks survived the period in name only but were 
not functioning at all.  It was only the central bank that was able to carry 
out limited commercial banking operations,’ says Noorullah Delawari, 
governor of Da Afghanistan Bank, the central bank.97 
 
Despite the slowly increasing number of services and banks available, the overall 
effect of the financial sector at the moment is limited in its reach.  For one, what little 
improvement in capacity or availability of service there is in Afghanistan is really 
 
 
93 Samuel M. Maimbo, “The Challenges of Regulating and Supervising the Hawaladars of Kabul,” in 
Rural Finance in Afghanistan: The Challenge of the Opium Economy: Report on a Two-Day Workshop, 
Kabul, Afghanistan, December 13-14, 2004, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005), 54. 
94 “Everything to Play For,” Foreign Direct Investment Magazine, June 07, 2005. 
http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/printpage/php/aid/1288/Everything_to_play_for.html (accessed April 3, 
2007). 
95 Thompson, 157. 
96 Foreign Direct Investment, 2005. 
97 Ibid. 
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restricted to Kabul.  Regional and provincial access to formal financial services is not 
readily available if at all.  Secondly, even in Kabul, practical access for the layman is 
problematic.   
 
To use an ATM at Afghanistan’s leading foreign bank requires you to run 
the gauntlet of a street known as Sniper Alley, then be patted down by a 
bristling security detail of Gurkhas before getting access to a cash machine 
that might or might not be functioning.98   
 
 
It is encouraging that reputable banks are opening shop in Afghanistan, but the 
reality on the streets of Kabul and throughout the countryside suggest that the formal 
financial sector is indeed infantile, and still given only granted a cursory look by most 
Afghans.  Essentially, Afghanistan’s formal financial sector is not engaged in any 
meaningful way in rural finance.  Afghanistan’s formal banking sector is immature and 
will take years to build.  However, many incremental reforms of the formal financial 
sector are underway. 
2. Government Reform and Growth 
To gain perspective on Afghanistan’s hawala system, one must understand the 
state of the formal financial sector, its reform efforts, and its interplay with hawala.  
Because of its non-existence or dysfunctional nature under the Taliban and the past 
decades of conflict, Afghanistan’s financial sector is being revamped from the ground 
up.99  Financial reform must start from scratch.  The biggest critique from policy analysts 
remains the inadequacy of services provided by Afghanistan’s banks.  While improving 
the capacity to offer Afghans meaningful alternative mechanisms to hawala will take 
time100 other recommendations made by Maimbo have been enacted.  Maimbo suggested 
 
98Eric Ellis, “Afghanistan Gets Back to Business,” E-Ariana (September 6, 2006),            
http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/ (Accessed April 2007). 
99 Ibid. 
100 It will take time to put in place substantive alternative financial services and mechanism to hawala.  
However, the physical capacity to offer alternative financial mechanisms or services to Afghans does not in 
any way suggest that it will necessarily lure Afghans away from hawala which is culturally much preferred 
and seen as much more Islamic in nature and character. 
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in 2003 that Afghanistan bring in regionally reputable banks with ties to South Asian 
financial networks.  Afghanistan has done this, with several banks of repute from India, 
Pakistan and elsewhere opening branches in Afghanistan.101  Other foreign banks are 
from the UK, Tajikistan, and Iran.102 
While the preceding section paints a bleak picture, there is measurable, though 
small progress.  “Compared with conditions in December 2001- an outdated legal 
framework, no functioning commercial banks, a handful of NGOs competing with a 
vibrant informal financial sector- a basic formal financial system has emerged.”103  The 
government of Afghanistan has worked feverishly to empower Da Afghanistan Bank by 
enacting several laws giving DAB greater autonomy.  More branches are electronically 
connected, a basic monetary policy is emerging, including the emergence of a new 
currency, and by and large the ability of DAB to function in practical ways for its 
customers has improved.104 
Despite its limited services, the slow but upward trajectory of the Central Bank 
(DAB) makes it a relatively successful story in Afghanistan.  The bank is run by 
Noorullah Delawari, a successful commercial banker from Southern California who 
returned to his native country in 2002 with a strong desire to improve it.105  As Delawari 
boasts, “We have come a long way in a short time.”106  When the Taliban fled in 
December 2001 they raided the vaults of DAB leaving behind a skeleton of a bank.  In 
Delawari’s first 18 months as governor of the central bank, he helped grow its assets to 
U.S. $2 billion.  Perhaps his most successful reform alluded to earlier was his push for 
legislation in 2003 that ultimately replaced four competing currencies with one 
currency.107 
 
101 Foreign Direct Investment, 2005. 
102 Ellis. 
103 Maimbo (2005), 56-57. 





                                                
Other positive signs of reform and growth are in the amount of money being 
handled by the new banks emerging in Afghanistan’s financial landscape.  UK’s Standard 
Chartered handles roughly 70% of the U.S. $3-4 billion in annual aid inflow.  Also, local 
banks such as the ING-backed Afghanistan International Bank, Azizi Bank and 
Kabulbank have taken in excess of $350 million in deposits.108 
The most ‘outside the box’ thinking and formal sector financial innovation is 
found in the Kabulbank.  Kabulbank is a three-year old joint venture with partners from 
the same Afghan hawala network that is seen as the source of so much terrorist financing 
by the U.S. government.  It is owned by a conglomerate of hawaladars who became rich 
operating within Afghanistan’s informal hawala system.109  Kabulbank has used 
eccentric and radical concepts of advertising and operations to lure customers.  The 
biggest draw is basically a national lottery.  There are semantic differences and legalistic 
nuances in its strict form so as to technically not be a lottery, but in effect, that is exactly 
what it is. Kabulbank has used this approach to gain widespread acclaim in Afghanistan.  
By all accounts, Kabulbank has been an amazing success story, collecting more than 
$200 million in deposits in its first two years of business.110 
The center of the excitement surrounding Kabulbank is the Bakht deposit account 
launched in April 2006.  In Dari bakht means “fortune.”  Kabulbank has capitalized on 
this cultural meaning with its chief advertising slogan that proclaims the Kabulbank 
Bakht initiative is “the easiest way to make a million.”111  Bakht has had a profound 
effect on Kabulbank’s growth.  Since Bakht’s inception, Kabulbank’s customer base has 
tripled, making it the largest of the 13 licensed commercial banks in Afghanistan 
operating since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom.112  The concept is simple.  
Every U.S. $100 deposited in the Bakht account (about Af$5000) entitles the depositor to 
a ticket for a drawing.  Monthly, Kabulbank conducts the Bakht lucky draw and televises 








                                                
Afghan celebrities, political figures and other notables to pull the winning ticket.  The 
winner’s name is read aloud and if present, he is presented a check for Af $1 million.113  
This is a lifetime fortune for any Afghan. 
Working around the tenets of Islam has been a semantic challenge, but Kabulbank 
has made it work.  Ellis explains: 
 
Gambling is banned in Islam and Kabulbank’s Bakht line differs crucially 
from a conventional lottery since the ticket holders, the depositors, keep 
their stake even if they don’t win the monthly draw for the Af1 million, a 
lifetime’s income or most of Afghanistan’s 30 million people.  Indeed, 
they remain eligible for the next draw, and those after that, with more 
chance available every time they deposit units of Af $5,000.  Although 
such a product wouldn’t pass the test of the Federal Reserve or the Bank 
of England- and it has disquieted mandarins at Kabul’s central bank, 
which changed its bank monitoring team three time- it’s a dubious stroke 
of marketing genius from the bank’s point of view.114 
 
 Delawari has led some of the most important formal sector reforms geared at 
curbing illicit or terrorist financial abuses in the Afghanistan economic system.  His most 
personally touted achievement is the creation of his bank’s surveillance division.  
Johnson Rappai, the CEO of Kabulbank, fully backs the leadership of the central bank 
and its mantra for curbing illicit abuse of the formal sector: 
 
‘You can’t just open an account here,’ Johnson says.  ‘All identity should 
be made available- your passport, your ID, your trade license.  Yes, people 
can tell lies or have forged documents but we make every effort to 
establish bona fides, we cross-check it when the money comes.  We ask 
you from where you got this one million dollars.’115   
 
Also, with the help of the U.S. Treasury Department, Delawari has set up a Financial 






                                                
advisers in order to help monitor suspicious activity.116  Delawari and DAB have made 
great strides to follow best business practices and thoroughly know their customers to the 
extent possible.  The creation of the FIU may not be all encompassing, but it is a step in 
the right direction to at least understand and map who is using Afghanistan’s financial 
institutions and for what purposes. 
 The central bank has pursued reform through other methods as well.  Bearing 
Point, a leading worldwide financial management and technology consulting company, is 
also serving the Afghan central bank in establishing sound economic and financial sector 
reform.117  Other outside the box financial initiatives include project financing for the 
agricultural sector and venture capital funds emphasizing investments that can capitalize 
on Afghanistan high risk, but equally high reward environment.118 
 Micro-financing is another innovative reform method in play in Afghanistan.  
“Microfinance is understood to mean the provision of banking (savings, credit, payment 
transfers) and insurance services for low income people, especially the poor, and is 
provided by a wide range of regulated financial institutions as well as NGOs.”119  The 
goal of the microfinance movement is to narrow the gap between services available for 
the few through the big financial institutions and the rural inhabitants of Afghanistan.  
Somewhere in the middle hopefully a system will take shape that promotes both 
“mainstream financial development and institutions that focus on offering the poor direct 
access to financial services.”120  In essence, microfinance reform is attempting to create 
financial service products and mechanism that more fully meet the needs of the poor than 
the formal sector mechanisms do. 
 
116 Ellis. 
117 Foreign Direct Investment. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Steve Rasmussen, “The Current Situation of Rural Finance in Afghanistan,” in Rural Finance in 
Afghanistan: The Challenge of the Opium Economy: Report on a Two-Day Workshop, Kabul, Afghanistan, 
December 13-14, 2004, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005), 23. 
120 Ibid., 23. 
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3. New Laws 
 Working with the U.S. Treasury Department, international financial experts, and 
others, Afghanistan has put in place a number of laws explicitly aimed at curbing terrorist 
and other illicit financial transactions by criminalizing them.  In Article 1 of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan’s Anti-money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Law, the 
purpose of the law is articulated clearly.  The purpose is to “prevent and prohibit the use 
of financial institutions or any economic activities for money laundering and for the 
financing of terrorism.”121  The law carefully defines money-laundering, details what 
individuals and institutions are subject to the law, creates provisions for greater 
transparency in financial transactions, prohibits anonymous accounts and transfers, 
establishes rules for amounts of cash that can cross its borders, sets trip-wire mechanisms 
for series of transactions meant to circumvent regulatory limits, provides for special 
monitoring of “unusual” transactions, outlines good banking practices for institutions, 
outlines how to keep detailed records, provides reporting requirements for suspicious 
transactions, and most prominently, established the Financial Intelligence Unit under the 
authority of Da Afghanistan Bank.  The FIU is granted by law with independent decision-
making authority in how it exercises the provisions of the law.  Additionally, this law 
grants the government and DAB great leeway to seize suspect fund and illicit accounts. 
 Afghanistan also created the Afghanistan Law on Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism.  This law further defines what constitutes an offense of financing terror.  It 
also delineates the government’s rights to confiscate, freeze, and hold property and funds 
alleged to have been used in the act of terrorism or through terror financing.  This law 
provides a general umbrella for more specific laws to follow. 
 Pursuant to Article 77 of the DAB Law, DAB outlines more specific regulations 
and rules for hawaladars.  The Foreign Exchange Dealer Law decrees that an applicant 
“must file an application acceptable to DAB to act as a foreign exchange dealer…” and 
that “no person may act as a foreign exchange dealer unless he holds a license issued by 
DAB.”   
 
121 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Anti-money laundering and Proceeds of Crime Law, 2004, 
http://www.centralbank.gov.af/laws&regulations-dab.asp (accessed June 2007). 
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In order to be eligible for the license, a person must: 
 
1. be at least 18 years old 
2. be the owner of a personal property such as a house or apartment; 
3. take a license in the name of a single person, with the license valid at a 
single locations of a business or multiple locations within the same 
province; 
4. Be referenced by two business persons with at least three years of 
commercial experience; 
5. Provide a national taxpayer identification number.122 
 
Other requirements include: the name, permanent address; and place of birth of 
the dealer; copy of the applicant’s national identification card; a photograph of the dealer; 
details of the dealer’s financial history; a list of who the dealer plans on doing business 
with; a copy of his tax payer identification number (TIN) certificate; any previous 
licenses; tax certification; certification from the Interior Ministry of the Criminal 
Department; receipt of licensing fee payment from DAB; and receipt of licensing deposit 
from DAB.123  Additionally, the law mandates quarterly reporting to the DAB and the 
strictest cooperation and transparency of its transactions with the government. 
 The Money Service Providers’ Law has similarly stringent provisions.  Applicants 
must demonstrate their fitness for trust by the state, have an established address for 
business, agree to the tenets of the Anti-Terrorism Law detailed previously, and agree to 
a DAB “Money Service Providers Licensing Agreement.”  Money Service Providers may 
engage in money transmission, safekeeping of funds, and check cashing, but are 
prohibited from using other than DAB’s official record books for recording customer and 
transaction information, acceptance of deposits, foreign exchange transactions, granting 
of loans, including terminology indicative of any other services provided other than 
“money service provider” in the title of the business, payment system operations as 
 
122 DAB Foreign Exchange Dealer Law, http://www.centralbank.gov.af/laws&regulations-dab.asp 




                                                
enumerated in Article 89 of the Law of DAB, security services enumerated in Article 94  
of the Law of DAB, or securities transfer systems enumerated in Article 98 of the Law of 
DAB.124 
4. Hawala Interaction with the Formal Sector 
In contrast to its eastern neighbors, Afghan hawaladars have limited contact with 
the formal financial sector.125  One of the chief reasons for the limited interaction with 
the formal sector is the physical location.  Formal financial institutions are nowhere near 
the bazaars and markets where Afghan hawaladars operate.  Due to both the physical 
limitations of the hawaladars and the very real security concerns, the daily visits required 
of a hawaladar to conduct business with formal institutions would be very problematic.  
As opposed to the close proximity of hawaladars and formal banks in Pakistan, “in 
Kabul, on the other hand, new banks are being established in an area disconnected from 
the main business districts, making it difficult for the sarafi126 operating in Sarai Sha 
Zadar to access them.”127  Other than the few instances such as the success of 
Kabulbank, interaction between the formal and informal sectors of the Afghanistan 
financial world has been sparse.  The obstacles, grievances and historical reasons for this 
limited interplay will be explored further sepa
E. THE NEXUS OF DRUGS AND HAWALA128…AND TERROR? 
1. A Problem of Epic Proportions 
 Afghanistan’s drug problem has reached grand heights.  With cooperative weather 
and perfect harvest conditions, Afghanistan’s opium production increased 17% in 2007.  
2007 UN statistics estimate a whopping 8200 tons of opium were produced this past year.  
In fact, more land is dedicated for opium cultivation in Afghanistan than there is land 
 
124 Regulation on Money Service Providers under the Law of DAB, 
http://www.centralbank.gov.af/laws&regulations-dab.asp (accessed June  2007). 
125 Thompson, 182. 
126 Saraf, or plural, sarafi, is the Afghan name that hawaladars often call themselves 
127 Ibid., 182. 
128 From Thompson’s title phrase, The Nexus of Drug Trafficking and Hawala in Afghanistan. 
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designated for coca cultivation in Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia combined.129  In recent 
years, Afghanistan has produced an estimated 87% of the world’s opium supply.130  In 
2007, Afghanistan is producing a staggering 93% of the world’s opiate market.131  
Afghanistan’s opiate production is on an unprecedented scale in the history of mankind. 
 The bulk of the opiate economy is located in the south-west of Afghanistan.  70% 
of Afghanistan’s entire opiate production is in the five provinces that border Pakistan.  In 
fact, it is estimated that 50% of the state’s entire opium originates in one province, 
Helmand.132  Helmand is the richest drug province or state in the world.  The 17% 
increase in opiate cultivation in 2007 raised the production from 165,000 ha in 2006 to 
193,000 ha this past year.  The net effect was a 17% increase in the total world opiate 
cultivation!133  In the past few years of conflict and war, Afghanistan has distinguished 














129 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007: Executive 
Summary,” (New York: United Nations, 2007), iv. 
130 Johnson DRAFT, 30.  
131 UNODC Executive Summary, iv. 
132 Ibid., iv. 
133 Ibid., 3. 
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Table 2. 2007 Afghanistan Opium Estimates.  (After: UNODC, Afghanistan 
Opium Survey 2007 Executive Summary) 
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2. The Convergence of Poppy Seeds and Bullets 
An interesting trend appears in the 2007 UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey.   
While the poorer regions remain in northern Afghanistan, opiate production has 
diminished there.  However, opiate cultivation has increased dramatically in the south-
west and east of Afghanistan.  It should not be lost on anyone that this is the heart of the 
current insurgency and the provinces plagued by al Qaeda, the Taliban remnants, and 
other terrorist entities. 
 
This North-South divide highlights three new circumstances.  First, opium 
cultivation in Afghanistan is no longer associated with poverty-quite the 
opposite.  Hilmand, Kandahar and three other opium-producing provinces 
in the south are the richest and most fertile, in the past the breadbasket of 
the nation and a main source of earnings.  They have now opted for illicit 
opium on an unprecedented scale (5,744 tons) while the much poorer 
northern region is abandoning the poppy crops.  Second, opium cultivation 
in Afghanistan is now closely linked to insurgency.  The Taliban today 
control vast swathes of land in Hilmand, Kandahar and along the Pakistani 
border.  By preventing national authorities and international agencies from 
working, insurgents have allowed greed and corruption to turns orchards, 
wheat and vegetable fields into poppy fields.  Third, the Taliban are again 
using opium to suit their interests.  Between 1996 and 2000, in Taliban-
controlled areas 15,000 tons of opium were produced and exported – the 
regime’s sole source of foreign exchange at the time.  In July 2000, the 
Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, argued that opium was against Islam and 
banned its cultivation (but not its export).  In recent months, the Taliban 
have reversed their position once again and started to extract from the drug 
economy resources for arms, logistics and militia pay.134 
 
Opiate cultivation, production and distribution have become a staple ingredient in 
the financial planning of terrorists, insurgents, and other jihadists.  Thus far, the Karzai 
regime has proved inept in curbing its preeminence in the Afghan economy.135  This is 
because as big of a problem as the opiate cultivation is, the corruption and greed rampant 
in his government may be even worse.  There is no accountability and everyone from the 
Taliban to high-level government officials like General Daud, the Interior Minister for 
Counter Narcotics are rumored to have their hand in the cookie jar. 
                                                 
134 UNODC Executive Summary, iv-v. 
135 Johnson DRAFT, 34. 
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3. The Dark Triangle: Hawala, Drugs and Terror 
“The presence of a burgeoning opium economy and terrorism in Afghanistan 
provides for considerable risk to the hawala system.”136  As the insurgency has grown in 
recent years alongside the booming opium crops, a natural nexus has emerged between 
drugs and terror.  This nexus occurs in the informal hawala network that helps conceal 
the financial movements of both illicit industries.  While Thompson provides a lengthy 
and superb analysis of every region in Afghanistan and its hawala connections with the 
drug economy, pursuant to the goals of this thesis, this section will focus on her analysis 
of the provinces and regions in the heart of the Pashtun belt.  It is the hypothesis of this 
author that there is a direct correlation between the intensity of terrorist/insurgent 
activities in certain areas and the intensity of hawala drug-related transactions in certain 
areas that are well-documented by Thompson.  It seems very logical that in these areas 
with intense drug-related hawala activity, there might also be intense abuse of the hawala 
networks by insurgents/terrorists.  This data is not available, but is deserving of further 
academic research. 
Helmand and Kandahar are located in the heart of Pashtun country that stretches 
across the border into Pakistan.  These provinces are “ideally placed to exploit the 
extensive Pashtun trading networks that reach many of the world’s key financial sites.”  
As one saraf, or hawaladar, described the nature of the relationship between Helmand 
(or Hilmand) and Kandahar, “you may as well see them as one and the same market.”137  
The same holds true for the areas on the other side of the border.  Just as Helmand and 
Kandahar are one Pashtun economy with tight interdependence, so are the cross-border 
economies and social ties with the Pashtuns in Pakistan.  It is one network, one economy, 
and one kindred social viewpoint. 
Because of Kandahar’s strategic location in Pashtun country it is “an important 
site to explore the links between the informal hawala networks and the trafficking of 
drugs.”138  This thesis argues that the nexus between drugs and terror makes Kandahar an 
 
136 Amit Sharma, Naval Postgraduate School, July 31, 2007. 
137 Thompson, 170. 
138 Thompson, 176. 
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important site to study the correlation between hawala and terror, too.  If hawala is being 
exploited for the concealed movement of illicit drug funds, it seems reasonable to assume 
that it is being exploited in a similar fashion and with similar intensity by insurgents and 
terrorists.  Helmand, too, boasts similar pre-conditions for abuse of its hawala network. 
Examining the UN data juxtaposed with Thompson’s survey data, there seems a 
clear connection between hawala, drugs and terror money.  Through a representative 
survey of 10 small, medium and large hawaladars in the major markets of Kandahar City 
and Helmand, Thompson estimates there are a median 54 hawaladars who specialize in 
drug transactions.  “There was considerable unanimity among medium-large dealers 
when asked to estimate the percentage of hawaladars indirectly involved in drug money 
laundering.  Helmand dealers estimated that 80-85% dealt in drug funds, while Kandahar 
dealers estimated that 90% handled drug money.”139  While further academic 
investigation is warranted, it seems likely there is a similar cadre of hawaladars, maybe 
some of the same sarafi, who specialize in terror leg of the black triangle.  Thompson 
does not map out this area of the Afghanistan hawala network, but provides solid basis 
for further investigation.  Sharma, a Treasury Department official who has spent time in 
Afghanistan investigating the hawala system and financial reform there, offers this 
conclusion: 
 
The broad answer is, yes folks (hawaladars) agreed that they did ‘know’ 
their customers, and therefore did indeed know much of the time what the 
business they were facilitating included… that said, everyone I spoke with 
did admit that facilitating terror (and other illicit activity for that matter) 
was not a good thing, and that they did want to find solutions that they 
could shove out this business but do so in a way that still retained their 
access to the larger pool of funds and the market…. I do think there is a 
distinction drawn between facilitating narcotics and terrorism – absolutely 
– and we need to remember that financially facilitating some of the drug 
trade is interpreted different ways… especially if some count their 
livelihood that way.140 
 
139 Thompson, 177. 
140 Amit Sharma, Email message to the author, November 1, 2007. 




 Figure 3. Percentage of Drug-Related Hawala Transactions. (From: 
Thompson)141 
                                                 
141 Thompson, 156. 
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The nexus between drugs and hawala is palpable.  The more difficult connection 
is the third leg of the black triangle: terror.  Accepting Thompson’s data as fact, or as 
close to fact as one can get in the inherently recluse and informal hawala network of 
Afghanistan, one must next examine the interplay of terror in hawala.  The UN data 
shows the richest poppy cultivation in the volatile southern provinces of Helmand and 
Kandahar, as well as a few eastern and north-eastern provinces.  The connection between 
drugs and terror, and implicitly hawala, come into focus in U.S. Central Command’s data 
on 2006 coalition forces attacks during the months leading up to harvest in the 
aforementioned drug provinces.  Insurgent and terrorist activities in Helmand, Kandahar 
and the eastern, northeastern provinces are highest during the peak drug months of early 
2006.  There seems an obvious direct connection between the two, and likewise, given 
the exposed abuse by drug-specialist hawaladars in these provinces and the researched 
data showing extremely high percentages of overall hawala drug-related activity in 
Helmand and Kandahar, an equally apparent connection of the two with hawala.  It is 
unlikely that there are as many actors involved either as terror hawaladars or 
terrorist/insurgents actors in general due to the nature of terrorism and its high risk and 
low financial reward.  Still, even if the number of hawaladars involved is fewer, there is 
a high probability of correlation to the intensity of hawala drug transactions in 
Afghanistan’s volatile southern provinces. 
The drug and terror networks are more duplicitous than imagined.  They appear to 
be one convergent network with tactical differences but complimentary strategic 
outlooks.  In many cases, they may be exactly the same.  Certainly, it appears probable 
that the hawaladars that service both the drug and terror industries are the same, though 
further field research is desired to verify this hypothesis.  It is reasonable to assume that a 
hawaladar that bears the risk of dealing with drugs might also be tempted by the allure 
terror financing.  It is probably more certain that hawaladars that deal with terrorist 
transactions initially also deal with drugs if given the opportunity.  The final bit of mud in 
the water is the rich Pashtun interdependence that sweeps into Pakistan provides 
policymakers and regulators with a difficult context in which to begin deciphering the 
tightly woven nexus of Afghanistan’s black triangle. 
 Figure 4. 2006 Opium Poppy Cultivation. (After: United Nations) 
 46
 Figure 5. OEF Attacks on Coalition Forces February 2006. (From: CENTCOM 
and Thomas Johnson) 
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 Figure 6. OEF Attacks on Coalition Forces March 2006.  (From: CENTCOM 
and Thomas Johnson) 
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 Figure 7.  OEF Coalition Attacks April 2006.  (From: CENTCOM and Thomas 
Johnson) 
F. REGULATORY AND REFORM MODELS: THE WAY FORWARD 
1. Current Models 
In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent 
international efforts to combat money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism, abstaining from regulation or supervision of the informal 
financial system is no longer a tenable option.142 
   
Given the intense interest and focus on the hawala system of the Middle East and 
Islamic world post 9/11, some measure of oversight or regulation is required.  One can 
make a strong case that no regulation is needed whatsoever, but given the political 
                                                 
142 Maimbo (2003), 16. 
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climate, such a position is politically unsustainable.  Within this framework several 
regulatory models are on the table, several have been enacted at the behest of the U.S. 
government and international coalition, and others have suggested strategic guidelines 
that map out best practices to maximize the benefit of hawala while curbing the illicit 
components.  The most critical aspect of any regulation, though, must consider the unique 
characteristics of Afghanistan’s financial system and people.  Hawala in the U.A.E. is not 
hawala in Pakistan.  Hawala in Pakistan is not hawala in Afghanistan.  Hawala in 
Afghanistan is not hawala in the U.A.E..  Blunt regulatory tools143 and policy cannot be 
universally applied to the many people who utilize hawala.  It is culturally ignorant to do 
so, and unrealistic to expect the people of Afghanistan to wrap their arms around a policy 
better suited for Pakistan or maybe Indonesia. 
In Maimbo’s field research, many hawaladars in fact did make passionate 
arguments against any regulation.  Four main points emerged in this argument:  First, 
hawaladars are difficult to identify for regulation.  Some are only hawaladars, but others 
operate as hawaladars in addition to being a butcher, or running a market store.  Second, 
there is no incentive to open themselves up as a business community to external 
regulation.  Hawaladars fear the big stick approach shown by regulators in the al 
Barakaat debacle in Somalia.  Third, hawala transactions are varied and would be 
difficult to develop a regulatory pattern for.  Lastly, even if sound regulations were 
feasible, DAB absolutely lacks the capacity to enforce anything.144  For the hawaladars, 
regulation appears wrought with danger and low in reward.  From the government 
perspective, Afghanistan needs to focus its immediate attention elsewhere first.   
 
Afghanistan’s central bank faces several basic but fundamental challenges-all 
of which makes the matter of regulating the hawaladars less urgent by 
comparison…Even when compared with other conflict-afflicted countries, 
Afghanistan’s authorities face great challenges.145 
  
 
143 Specifics of U.S. regulatory policy and the FATF special recommendations on terror financing are 
discussed in-depth in a separate chapter. 
144 Maimbo (2003), 16. 
145 Maimbo, 16-17. 
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What does work in Afghanistan is self-regulation.  The hawaladars of Kabul have 
been self-regulating without any oversight since 1930.146  There are over 300 self-
regulating hawaladars in the Kabul Money Exchange.  The Kabul hawaladars even serve 
under an executive committee “responsible for enforcing the tacit rules and business 
codes of the market; code violations bring serious consequences.  The executive 
committee is also responsible for the amicable settlement of disputes.”147  Self-regulation 
is a viable option because the hawaladars are better able to identify the problems within 
hawala and deal with them more effectively than any external regulators every could.  
Even hawaladar input was solicited in the right way, hawaladars might have a more 
vested interest in the rules and regulations imposed (since they created them) and this 
might narrow the gap between the formal financial world (and government) and the 
hawala system.148  Self-regulation allows for a more realistic approach to effective 
regulation than that from the FATF or central bank which is largely seen as meddling or 
external interference in legitimate business. 
 Another option on the table is a hybrid model aimed at creating transparency 
without sacrificing the allure of hawala’s inexpensiveness, efficiency, and reach.  In an 
incremental process, carefully choreographed with the help of the hawaladars 
themselves, hawaladars would be asked to register (not licensed), identify customers 
carefully to include physical address, bear the responsibility of suspicious activity 
reports, and when necessary, facilitate investigations.149 
2. Challenges to Reform 
Hawala is ingrained in the cultural and religious landscape of Afghanistan.  It is 
part of daily life.  “The market has such a long history of operational and regulatory 
independence that external oversight is unlikely to be easily welcomed- especially if it is 
overly burdensome.”150  Afghanistan, a state plagued by the great game and other 
 
146 Maimbo (2005), 57. 
147 Maimbo (2003), 17. 
148 Ibid., 17. 
149 Ibid., 17. 
150 Maimbo (2005), 58. 
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imperial interferences does not want external or western policies forced on them.  This is 
the first challenge.  Afghans simply prefer hawala.  It is a subtle but important point; this 
is what the people want. While not exclusive to Muslims, hawala is sanctioned by sharia 
law and is synonymous with Islamic banking.  It is a cultural aspect of Islam that can be 
traced back to the Prophet Mohammed, himself a trader and user of the informal 
economy. 
Literacy is another impediment to hawala reform or acceptance of regulation.  
Broad FATF regulations not adapted to Afghanistan miss the mark and alienate the 
population.  74% of Afghans and 91% of women are illiterate and most have no formal 
identification.151  This social condition is a disabling pre-text for the transfer of hawala 
informal economy to the formal sector.  It is unrealistic and ignorant to expect Afghans to 
embrace rules better suited for a U.S. state.  Western corporate procedures and business 
plans, formal accounting, and other reform ideas that are being incorporated by U.S.AID 
(United States Agency for International Development) and the World Bank are unlikely 
to succeed given the underlying illiteracy problem in Afghanistan.  Delawari is pushing 
universities to offer courses on business, accounting, and financial literacy152, but this is 
a long-term problem with a slow process toward improvement.  In the meanwhile, it is a 
huge obstacle to reform. 
Perhaps the most glaring error in policy and hindrance to hawala regulation or 
reform is the lack of input received from hawaladars, or rather the lack soliciting of 
hawaladars by policy makers.  Every expert from Wilson to Thompson to Passas to 
Maimbo has suggested what is plain to see; the first step in any serious discussion of 
moving forward should be to co-opt the hawaladars of Afghanistan, namely the 
executive committee of Kabul’s market.  Yet, six years after 9/11, this has not genuinely 
happened.  Talk is cheap.  While the U.S. Treasury Department and the DAB will almost 
certainly say that hawaladars have been engaged in the reform process, including the 
most recent round of laws concerning money-dealers and foreign exchange dealers, 
 
151 Thompson, 186. 
152 Ellis. 
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research shows this engagement to be skin-deep.  Commenting on the Treasury 
Department’s own mission to Kabul in 2004, this conclusion was reached: 
 
Several hawala dealers commented on the fact that while the DAB had 
several open forums for discussion on the issuance of new regulations, the 
forums provided only limited opportunity for the engagement of the sector 
on the establishment of those regulations since DAB had substantially 
determined the nature of the regulations themselves prior to the forums, 
and in any case, only a few of the Kabul based dealers attended.  As a 
result, incentives for compliance are not built into the legal framework nor 
supported by credible enforcement.  Therefore, there has been little to no 
cooperation with regard to the development and implementation of the 
present regulatory and supervisory framework or compliance.153 
 
 
Whether or not it is reality, the perception among hawaladars is certainly one of 
alienation and exclusion from the reform process by the government. 
Hawaladars have a preset suspicion of authority.  “Collaboration with 
government regulators requires a profound social and psychological stretch for those who 
run the networks.”154  The mistrust of the formal sector and government regulation 
creates an inherent problem.    
 
Hawaladars view law enforcement agencies with suspicion and often 
contempt.  Unlike other informal sector enterprises, such as the drug trade 
where there are close alliances with elements of the police, hawaladars 
have an adversarial relationship with law enforcement and view them as a 
major source of corruption and theft.155  
 
There is no strong inclination for hawaladars to emerge from the shadows, much 
less be dragged out by their feet. 
Finally, hawaladars acknowledge that there are certainly illicit funds facilitated 
through their hawala system.  However, as individual hawaladars, they would not stem 
 
153 Amit Sharma, Naval Postgraduate School, July 31, 2007. 
154 Thomas A. Timberg, “Informal Remittance Systems and Afghanistan,” 
http://www.nathaninc.com/NATHAN/files/CCPAGECONTENT/DOCFILENAME/0000502422/Informal
%20Remittance%20Systems%20and%20Afghanistan.pdf (accessed May 2007), 7. 
155 Thompson, 169. 
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the flow.156  There is too much at stake.   In a business environment run on honor, 
interdependent peer relationships, and tacit rules, one cannot venture off the beaten path 
without consent.  The risk of being black-listed or cut out of the business partnerships 
required to conduct transactions is too great.  There is great fear among hawaladars that  
cooperation in driving out illicit funds would be disclosed (back to the issue of general 
mistrust of the central government) and financially ruin their own business due to the 
interdependent nature of hawala. 
G. THE HAWALA THREAT: PRIMARY VARIABLES IN AFGHANISTAN 
THAT WARRANT ANALYSIS IN OTHER CASE STUDIES 
In examining Afghanistan’s hawala system and whether it is a strategic threat to 
U.S. counter-terror efforts, four variables should be given primary consideration.  
Afghanistan exhibits these four factors in varying degrees and emphasis.  Three factors 
present in Afghanistan’s hawala system indicate benign uses for hawala that should 
reassure U.S. financial investigators and intelligence agencies when examining other 
cases such as Pakistan and U.A.E.  The last variable predominant in Afghanistan offers a 
point of analysis that is a presumable indicator of illicit abuse.  This last variable may still 
not be a strategic threat, but is assuredly some level of threat and the most likely arena in 
which hawala will be subject to unbridled abuse.  These important variables should be 
the first points of focus in other case studies that assess hawala’s complicity with terrorist 
financing and its strategic threat to the U.S.. 
First, one must consider the Islamic aspect of hawala.  If the community, state, or 
population under analysis is predominantly Muslim, because of the strong cultural place 
hawala holds within Islamic society, in that particular case, hawala is likely not a 
strategic threat.  It should be expected and understood that indigenous Muslims prefer, 
trust and primarily utilize such informal methods for finance such as hawala.  Muslims 
will always desire to conduct business in the same manner that Mohammed did.   
A second important variable is the vitality of the formal banking sector.  For 
instance, in Afghanistan, despite some measured success and slow reform, the formal 
financial sector is infantile.  In remote areas of Afghanistan it is entirely non-existent.  In 
 
156 Amit Sharma, Naval Postgraduate School, July 31, 2007. 
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this case study, Afghans by and large have no other choices.  If a state or community 
lacks sufficient formal banking mechanisms that are proven, trustworthy and reliable, the 
reliance of its population on hawala can most likely be written off as necessary.  In the 
absence of significant formal banking institutions, people must utilize hawala and similar 
methods for financial transactions.  Hawala is imperative for the state to function. 
A third primary factor to consider in analyzing the threat of hawala is the 
expatriate component of the hawala system.  Certainly there are Afghans scattered 
throughout South Asia and the Middle East who are sending remittances home to family.  
While Afghanistan itself does not have a huge expatriate concentration like Dubai does, 
its position on the receiving end of expatriate remittances makes it an important variable.  
Whether it is Afghanistan and Pakistan receiving unknown scores of remittances through 
hawala or U.A.E. with millions of expatriates working in its state, the presence of 
expatriate remittances indicates a necessary function of survival for millions of workers. 
The transmittal of millions of dollars by expatriates to their families in remote parts of the 
region presents a hint of normalcy in hawala rather than a strategic threat of criminal 
abuse to America or its allies in the financial war on terrorism. 
Fourth, as Thompson and others have laid out in great detail, the nexus of drug 
and terror is palpable.  To the extent that hawala is being misused for criminal purposes 
in Afghanistan, particularly its volatile southern provinces such as Helmand, drugs are a 
predominant factor or variable to consider.  From all accounts the flow of terrorist funds 
through hawala is minimal.  The 9/11 Commission, Passas and others have proved that 
the 9/11 hijackers did not use hawala.  Furthermore, scholarly literature on the matter 
suggests that al-Qaeda finances are more limited than many in the media initially thought.  
When hawala was used, it seems to be not as a measure of strategic exploitation or 
deception of western financial scrutiny, but rather because that is what was available in 
Afghanistan!  However, to the extent insurgent or al-Qaeda funds do flow through 
hawala, certainly this case study has shown that beneath the cloak of drugs is the first 
place one should look. 
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H. AFGHANISTAN: POLICY MISSTEPS AND THE CULTURAL FALLOUT 
The U.S. Treasury Department has totally failed to see social and cultural realities 
on the ground.  Ironically, the Bush Administration found out the hard way that they had 
to rely on the same hawala network terrorists use to move money in Afghanistan to get 
anything done after the Taliban fell.  A little historical perspective can go a long way.  
This sort of improper framing of the issue has plagued U.S. foreign policy and certainly 
its approach to hawala. 
“During the decades of conflict, trust in the government was progressively eroded 
and transposed to kinship, ethnic, and other social connections.”157  The gravitational 
pull of these ties is forceful.  These social and ethnic ties bind the Afghan people, not the 
central government.  It is in these contexts that the Afghan people want to conduct their 
business, not under the perceived interference of Kabul or the U.S. Treasury 
Department’s regulations.  “Afghanistan’s political economy is so deeply constituted 
through regional and international associations that it would be a mistake to view it in a 
purely national context.”158  Yet that is exactly what the U.S. is attempting to do through 
FATF regulations and DAB laws.  It is a mistake that ignores the rich cultural history of 
Afghanistan. 
 Afghanistan is not hopeless.  The government of Afghanistan is doing many 
things right.  Formal sector reforms are moving nicely.  However, any reform or 
regulation of the hawala sector must be done slowly and cautiously.  Centuries of social 
memory cannot be erased.  Hawala works in Afghanistan.  Hawala is embraced by Islam.  
These are facts that should not be ignored but rather adroitly leveraged in Afghanistan.   
The Afghanistan case study affirms the scholars’ school of thought on hawala.  
The crux of this school of thought rests in the core belief that regulation of hawala needs 
to be tempered with patience, regional collaboration, socio-economic and cultural 
sensitivity, and broader formal financial reform.  Rushing to too quick of 
recommendations and regulation will not benefit the U.S. in its long-term efforts to defeat 
al Qaeda.  If counter-terror efforts are to curb hawala usage for criminal elements without 
 
157 Thompson, 157. 
158 Ibid., 170. 
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denying its sanctity to legitimate users then reform must address Afghanistan’s rich 
culture.  Another tenet of the scholars’ school of thought is that broader formal financial 
reform will have a more desired effect in reducing hawala misuse than direct external 
pressure and regulation on hawala through registration and licensing.  This case study 
shows that Looney, Passas and Maimbo are correct.  Regulation cannot achieve its 
desired effect without broad and gentle financial reform in all sectors of the Afghan 
economy.  Lastly, as de Gourde emphatically states: you must account for the socio-
economic and cultural effects of any hawala regulation.  Al Barakaat is but one example 
of regulators not looking ahead and serious considering the cultural second and third 
order effects of stamping out hawala.  Heavy-handed regulation is disastrous.  
Afghanistan bears out the preeminence of socio-economic and cultural impact of poorly 
designed financial regulation.  The scholars’ school provides the most appropriate lens in 
which to analyze Afghanistan’s hawala system. 
Ultimately, the most important truth to glean from Afghanistan is the utter 
inefficacy of any reform that does not include the hawaladars themselves in the creative 
process.  Due to the social constraints, business practices and history of self-regulation, it 
is imperative to have hawaladar support in any regulatory measures.  Less than full 
endorsement and collaboration in regulatory legislation or enforcement will doom any  
such measures to failure.  Trust must be earned.  However, the government can reach out 




























                                                
IV. CONCLUSION: THE HAMMER AND THE OLIVE BRANCH 
Ultimately the hawala system is not a strategic threat to the United States.  While 
some illicit finance undoubtedly flows through its networks, the vast majority of its users 
are using it for honest and simple tasks for which there are no other means, especially in 
Afghanistan.  Al-Qaeda’s use of hawala to plan and finance 9/11 has been disproved and 
dismissed.  This was largely the ill-bred assumption that caused hawala to draw the ire of 
the U.S. government in the first place.  Most Afghans are financially illiterate.  Afghans 
do not trust formal banking.  They want to cloak their financial business in the Qur’an.  
Furthermore, formal sector reform is slow and even if Afghans did want to use formal 
institutions for remittances and other hawala transactions, it is not feasible for most of the 
country.  There is plainly no strategic threat.  Hawala is just what is most available to 
Afghans.  The only strategic threat related to hawala in the Middle East and Muslim 
world is the very real alienation the U.S. will cause if it applies heavy-handed and 
culturally ignorant regulatory measures like it did in the al-Barakaat case.  The U.S. must 
engage the hawaladars.  
This conclusion looks at U.S. regulation efforts in addressing hawala as directed 
by the Department of the Treasury.  After exploring U.S. measures to combat illicit abuse 
of hawala, it briefly revisits Afghanistan and further synthesizes the most cogent findings 
of the Afghanistan case study.  Next, it identifies Pakistan and U.A.E. as cases where 
further research is warranted and succinctly explains their importance to the U.S. in the 
financial war on terror.  Lastly, this conclusion draws out some final thoughts that bolster 
the findings of this thesis. 
A. U.S. HAWALA REGULATORY EFFORTS 
Hawala regulation is a “gross misstatement.”  It should be more aptly labeled, 
“combating illicit finances.”159  If the U.S. is going to wage an effective “War on 
Financial Terror”, then it must remove itself from the appearance of heavy-handed 
 
159 Amit Sharma, Naval Postgraduate School, July 31, 2007. 
 60
                                                
regulation of hawala.  The government must stop attempts to stamp out hawala and other 
informal mechanisms with measures such as EO 13224 and examine more closely the 
financial boxes around these transnational threats.  American policy must address 
systemic threats.  Hawala is not a systemic threat. It is certainly abused by illicit users 
and terrorist financiers, but these incursions into the hawala system are an infinitely small 
minority.  However, the results of over-extending U.S. endorsed international regulation 
in Afghanistan and elsewhere can have damaging social, cultural, and political ill effects.  
It presents a misleading paradigm for U.S. allies and those the U.S. desires to enlist as 
allies in the metaphorical “war on terror”:  we extend the olive branch while wielding a 
deadly hammer with the other hand. 
1. Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
“The U.S. is good at dropping the hammer… and the hammer is needed…but we 
don’t provide financial alternatives.”160  FATF recommendations are broad, blunt 
instruments.  EO 13224 and portions of the PATRIOT ACT are too broad and blunt to 
appropriately combat the intricate financial details of each Muslim country.  One cannot 
apply the same declarations on hawala that are used in Dubai on the hawaladars of 
Kabul.  Hawala in Kabul is not hawala in Quetta is not hawala in Abu Dhabi.  To deter 
illicit abuse by terrorists in Afghanistan, any hawala regulation, registration, or oversight 
must be taken in the context of Afghanistan alone.  Labels matter.  When the Treasury 
Department or the Department of State label an organization a terrorist organization that 
affects how the U.S. can engage it.  The FATF regulations suggested in the aftermath of 
9/11 – 2006 have created a prosecutorial approach, especially in the U.S., that has almost 
created a financial body-count mentality.  Success has equated to the number of 
“terrorist” organizations shut down.  While many of these entities may have been 
connected financially with terror groups, one must account for the legitimate goods and 
services provided by these same “terrorist” financiers.  In rural and financially 
handicapped countries like Afghanistan, the U.S. must provide better alternatives if it is 
going to eliminate one mechanism or means of financial transaction.  One must look no 
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further than al Barakaat in Somalia to witness the ill taste in the mouths of Muslims in 
the aftermath of EO 13224’s blunt prosecution of that case. 
2. What’s the Alternative? 
Providing an alternative has been a big failure on the part of the United States.  Al 
Barakaat is but one example of the disaster that can follow in the wake of the U.S. 
Treasury Department’s prosecutorial mindset in pursuing illicit finances through hawala.  
Somalia, by all accounts a failed state, relied heavily on the hawala network of the al 
Barakaat firm.  There was literally no formal sector for financial transactions or 
remittances.  The U.S. shut down al Barakaat by financially strangling its ability to 
interact with any bank or financial network.  To this day, the U.S. has not been able to 
indict or convict one person from al Barakaat for complicity with terrorist financing.  
One would not expect to find any sympathy among the people of Somalia for the U.S. in 
its war on terror with that opening engagement with the people of Somalia.  Al Barakaat 
remains shut down today. 
The idea of administrative sanctioning tools is to stop the behavior. It should not 
be to wipe out organizations that are imperative in Afghanistan and throughout the 
Middle East.  The U.S. has been able to stamp out hawala or enforce heavy-handed 
regulation in U.A.E. and elsewhere, but that fails to account for the cultural and economic 
negative impact in the countries where the U.S. pursues hawala regulation. 
 
It is an utter failure of the U.S. government to offer competitively 
sustainable solutions.  We wield the hammer effectively, but we don’t 
offer solutions for the services provided by Hamas or Hezbollah for 
example.161 
 
Illicit use of the hawala system cannot be based on broad regulatory models.  It must be 
specific to a given region or country. 
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B. REVISITING AFGHANISTAN: HAWALA TODAY 
In 2004, 95% of financial transactions went through the hawala system. Even the 
deputy governor of Kabul had a cousin who worked as a hawaladar.162  The hawala 
system is amazing liquid.  It is fast.  It is reliable.  Financial records and books are 
meticulous and detailed.  Every transaction is annotated despite some anecdotal evidence 
to the contrary in popular literature on hawala.  In addressing the abuse of hawala in 
Afghanistan, one must account for its utter importance both culturally to Afghanistan and 
to Islam.  Any engagement of the hawala system must take into account its significance 
culturally. 
Foremost, any regulation of the hawala system must engage the hawaladars.  
Both from a cultural and a practical standpoint, without there being an obvious Afghan 
face on the process of reform, it is utterly doomed to fail.  The U.S. must recognize the 
extreme pressure on hawaladars from their peers.  It is unlikely and moreover poor 
business acumen to cut off one bad transaction or questionable customer.  Hawaladars 
cannot afford to be blacklisted.  It is a system based on trust and reliability.  The hawala 
network stands on the integrity of the names of the hawaladars that make up the system.  
The U.S. cannot expect hawaladars to isolate themselves out of their livelihood system. 
There is still mistrust between hawaladars and regulators but certainly over time 
this has improved from right after 9/11.  Sharma explains this maturation process: 
 
One must remember that they are coming largely from a self-regulated 
environment, so being approached by formal regulators has brought on 
(understandably so) a bit of skepticism.  That said, yes, more and more 
have registered (almost a hundred now), and thus are opening books, 
disclosing, and are being much more transparent than in the past.  A good 
balance of incentives and enforcement can continue to improve this.163 
 
 
Also, whereas there used to be self-regulation only in Kabul, self-regulation is slowly but 
surely extending to all the provinces.  To the extent that Looney and others have 
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suggested broader reforms are needed to push more business, including illicit business, 
away from hawala, results are uncertain.  Some measured success has occurred, however: 
 
 Increased opportunities as the formal sector develops provide greater 
access through those channels at both retail and wholesale levels.  That 
being said, most formal banking (and reform) continues to be at 
commercial, trade finance and development finance levels, so much of the 
retail stuff is still done in informal channels (hawala).164 
 
 
There are other impediments to transitioning some volume of financial activity away 
from hawala.  One of the most severe hindrances is the illiteracy in Afghanistan.  For 
those who are illiterate, the formal sector is simply not an option.  The Treasury 
Department agrees: 
 
Literacy is a MAJOR issue… so is financial literacy… let’s not forget that 
the system (hawala) has worked for so many years because a lot of the 
technical knowledge of banking, et cetera is not needed by those who 
partake in the system.  This is less true if you want to use formal 
banking…. This is indeed a major issue… 
 
C. BEYOND AFGHANISTAN: AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Looking beyond Afghanistan’s hawala system, two of the most important cases to 
delve further into are the U.A.E. and Pakistan.  Hawala is prevalent throughout the 
Muslim world, especially in the Middle East and South Asia.  The most relevant hawala 
systems to the U.S. led “war on terror” are Pakistan and U.A.E.  Pakistan is important 
because of its strong Pashtun ties to Afghanistan which is the epicenter of U.S. kinetic 
operations in the larger “war on terror.”  Because of its tribal and Islamic roots, as well as 
its lawless and under-governed border regions with Afghanistan where the likes of bin 
Laden and other senior al Qaeda leadership are rumored to be hiding, Pakistan’s hawala 
network is certainly worthy of future research.  U.A.E. too is important because it is 
simple a regional financial powerhouse.  Because of the millions of expatriates working 
 
164 Amit Sharma, Email message to the Author.  November 1, 2007. 
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in the U.A.E. and sending millions of dollars home through hawala, further research is 
warranted into its overall hawala network.  Additionally, U.A.E. has summarily agreed to 
U.S. regulatory pressure on a number of financial issues, namely hawala.  It is worthy of 
a more exhaustive study to determine if U.S. led hawala regulation in the U.A.E. has 
positively impacted efforts to eradicate terrorist financing. 
1. Pakistan 
The focus of this thesis is specifically on the hawala system in Afghanistan and 
its complicity in illicit terrorist financing.  Nonetheless, it is important to take a brief look 
at other potential case studies that may provide some answers or a different perspective in 
the financial “war on terror.”  In some respects, to know the hawala system in 
Afghanistan is to know the Pakistan hawala system.  This section serves three purposes: 
First, it looks at the volatile border region which this thesis asserts is basically one 
hawala network (there are differences between Afghanistan and non-border region 
hawala networks).  Second, it looks briefly at Pakistan from a national perspective and 
assesses the hawala network from the macro-level.  Lastly, it juxtaposes the Afghanistan 
case study’s four primary hawala variables with Pakistan’s hawala system and provides a 
preliminary assessment of how well the maxims of the Afghanistan case study hold true. 
a. The Pashtun Belt and “Talibanistan” 
Because of the way Afghanistan and Pakistan were divided by colonial 
powers, the rich and culturally vibrant Pashtun belt crosses between the two countries.  
With the countless number of insurgents crossing back and forth between the border, 
particularly in the south of Afghanistan and Pakistan, some are calling the region 
“Talibanistan.”165  This is simply to suggest that to the extent the insurgent problem lies 
on both sides of the border, in “Talibanistan”, then the illicit and ethnic Pashtun hawala 
network also exists as one, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
 
165 Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy,” 100. 
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The border region is problematic for a myriad of reasons.  It is the poorest 
region in Pakistan.  It is flooded with refugees.  It is largely an ungoverned or under-
governed space.  Its high poverty and unemployment rates make it an economy largely 
“dependent on smuggling as well as narcotics and weapons trafficking.”166  It is because 
of this lawlessness and the scores of predominantly Afghan refugees that this border 
region of Pakistan must largely be read as one and the same as Afghanistan, 
economically-speaking.  Johnson and others have forcefully argued that: “there is little 
argument that the dynamics of the FATA167 are closely tied to the continuing problems 
in Afghanistan, especially the Taliban insurgency.”168  This thesis adds to that the 
likelihood that the same ethnic dynamics that dominate the insurgent situation also follow 
suit in regards to hawala.  Pakistan’s border hawala network is inextricably intertwined 
with Afghanistan’s because of the strong Pashtun ties. 
The same as any combat operations to root out the insurgency in 
Afghanistan, any counter-terrorist financial measures meant to address the hawala system 
must take into account the complexities of the Pashtun belt and Pashtunwali.169  
Thompson reaffirms the importance of the Afghanistan-Pakistan hawala connection:  
 
It is fair to deduce from discussions with hawaladars in Afghanistan that 
heir links to Pakistan are crucial for their survival.  As has already been 
demonstrated, a large part of the Afghan market relies heavily on 
Peshawar and Quetta as a conduit for delivery of money from places 
further afield.  NGOs and other international agencies- important 
customers of Afghanistan’s hawala system- frequently send their funds to 
Pakistan where the money is deposited and can be received in Afghanistan 
only hours later…of course there are also the drug payments to Afghan 
traders, which depend to a large extent on in follows from Pakistan.170 
 
 
166 Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy,” 112. 
167 Federally administered Tribal Area (FATA) that runs along the northwest border between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
168 Johhson (2007), 116. 
169 Pashtunwali literally means “the way of the Pashtun.” 
170 Thompson, 182. 
 Figure 8.  The Blurred Pashtun Border Between Pakistan and Afghanistan 
(From: Richard Furno, Washington Post and Thomas Johnson) 
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 Figure 9. Major Regional Ethnic Groups (From: Thomas Johnson) 
b. Pakistan’s Hawala from a Macro Viewpoint 
With increased regulation of hawala in U.A.E. there has been a ripple 
effect in Central Asia and throughout Pakistan.  Due to new stringent reporting 
requirements in Dubai the hawala system in Pakistan has been greatly affected.  “Hawala 
business is 75% gone now,” according to Malik Bostan, president of the Forex 
Association of Pakistan, a Karachi-based trade group.171 The crackdown in Dubai has 
forced hawaladars throughout Pakistan to consider other forms of business because they 
just are not receiving the same volume of transactions through the hawala system as they 
used to.  Banking experts in Pakistan estimate that $11 million of expatriate remittances 
                                                 
171 Naween Mangi, “Pakistan Cripples the Money Movers,” Business Week Online January 31, 2002. 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2002/nf20020131 6995.htm (accessed May 2007). 
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go through the hawala system per year, while only $1 million goes through official 
banks.  Reports suggest official channel remittances have tripled since the Dubai 
crackdown but there’s still a huge gap in between what the hawala serviced previously 
and what the official banks are servicing in the way of remittances now.172  The flood of 
American dollars into Pakistani banks as official remittance channels receive more 
business will strengthen the rupee versus the dollar.  Following U.A.E.’s lead, the State 
Bank of Pakistan has also initiated banking reforms aimed at thwarting illicit hawala 
transactions.   
 
The initial impetus came from the U.S. crackdown… Banks have 
now…positioned themselves to distribute remittances very quickly to 
families in Pakistan.173 
 
From a macro perspective, the hawala system has been hampered greatly by international 
pressure and Dubai-originated reform.  At the national level, financial experts and 
government officials are happy to see the hawala system degraded if it will bolster the 
rupee and created greater international transparency. 
c. Is Pakistan’s Hawala A Strategic Threat?: Assessing the 
Applicability of Afghanistan’s Primary Hawala Variables 
First, Pakistan is an Islamic state at its core.  Islam reverberates throughout 
its society.  Furthermore, as highlighted earlier, Pakistan largely shares its Pashtun 
culture with its Afghan neighbors.  Like Afghanistan, the prevalence of Islam and its 
importance to the lives of everyday Pakistanis suggests benign usage of hawala.  It is in a 
cultural and spiritual context in which hawala is used and this does not indicate explicit 
misuse by terrorist entities or present a strategic threat to the U.S.  One should to some 
degree expect heavy hawala usage in Pakistan.  This heavy hawala traffic should not 
 
172 Naween Mangi, “Pakistan Cripples the Money Movers,” Business Week Online January 31, 2002. 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2002/nf20020131 6995.htm (accessed May 2007).. 
173 Ishrat Husain, governor of the Bank of Pakistan, as quoted in “Pakistan Cripples the Money 
Movers,” Business Week Online January 31, 2002. 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2002/nf20020131 6995.htm (accessed May 2007). 
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necessarily be considered an indication of criminal abuse by terrorists but instead a 
reflection of the centrality of Islam to Pakistani culture. 
Second, in examining the robustness of the formal financial sector, one 
can make similar conclusions to those drawn from the Afghanistan case study.  Though 
Pakistan has a much more vibrant formal sector, there are still a plethora of remote 
locations that must rely on hawala such as the FATA and under-governed border regions 
with Afghanistan.  Perhaps a more exhaustive case study of Pakistan would demonstrate 
more cause for concern if significant traffic spikes occurred in more urban hawala 
networks where there are reputable banks, but overall, the second variable drawn from 
the Afghanistan case study appears to be more true than false in Pakistan.   
Third, like Afghanistan, a struggling economy and economic opportunities 
elsewhere have left Pakistan on the receiving end of millions of dollars in expatriate 
remittances.  As a large percentage of this volume is remittance traffic, Pakistan’s hawala  
network as a whole does not seem to be a threat externally.  Pakistanis are strewn across 
the Gulf region and Asia and this should understandably create significant hawala traffic 
back to Pakistan. 
Finally, drugs are a factor that is also dominant in Pakistan.  As Johnson 
explains, the shared identity and Pashtun nature of the border region that he calls 
“Talibanistan” is likely rampant with the same abuse that occurs on the Afghan side.  As 
both sides of the border are culturally linked, certainly Pakistan’s hawala system is in 
places infused with drug and terror money.  Perhaps a more exhaustive study of the nexus 
of drugs and hawala specifically focused on Pakistan’s side of the border would draw 
similar conclusions to Thompson’s seminal contribution to the literature concerning 
Afghanistan’s hawala network.  The focus of this thesis is not Pakistan, but further study 
of Pakistan’s hawala should explore abuse of the system by terrorists here first where it 
converges with the drug underworld. 
2. U.A.E. 
U.A.E. received great pressure from the United States of America after 9/11 to 
closely watch and clamp down on the illicit use of the hawala system for terrorism 
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financing.  U.A.E. was quick to jump on the U.S. bandwagon.  The focus of this thesis is 
not on U.A.E.’s hawala system, but rather on Afghanistan’s hawala system.  U.A.E.’s 
network is much different than Afghanistan’s or any other hawala network.  U.A.E. 
boasts a much more robust formal financial sector.  Nonetheless it is worth taking a quick 
look at the problems and reform initiatives that have been undertaken in the U.A.E. and 
briefly applying the four primary variables gleaned from the Afghanistan case study. 
a. International Conferences on Hawala 
Among other things, U.A.E. hosted the 1st International Conference on 
Hawala May 15-16, 2002, in Abu Dhabi.  The conference was attended by 58 countries 
and it resulted in a declaration of the participating countries and persons.  The Abu Dhabi 
Declaration on Hawala in part reads: 
 
• Recognizing the need to better understand hawala and other 
informal remittance systems and to ensure that this system is not 
abused by money launderers and terrorist financiers, the 
Government of the United Arab Emirates brought together experts 
and representatives of the international regional bodies and 
regulatory and law enforcement agencies as well as bankers and 
money changers, in Abu Dhabi on May 15-16, 2002… 
• However participants also raised concerns about Hawala and other 
informal remittance systems, noting that a lack of transparency and 
accountability, as well as the absence of governmental 
supervisions, presents the potential for abuse by criminal elements. 
• Countries should adopt the 40 Recommendations of the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering and the 8 
Special recommendations on Terrorist Financing in relation to 
remitters, including hawaladars and other alternative remittance 
providers. 
• Countries should designate supervisory authorities to monitor and 
enforce the application of these recommendations… 
• The international community should remain seized with the issue 
and should continue to work individually and collectively to 
regulate the Hawala system for legitimate commerce and to 
prevent its exploitation or misuse by criminals and others.174 
 
174 Abu Dhabi Declaration on Hawala, 2002, 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/programs/Hawala-conf.pdf (accessed May 2007). 
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One could easily get bogged down in the plethora of legal documents that 
have emanated from the Central Bank of the U.A.E. regarding hawala.  That misses the 
point. Rather, it should just be understood that the U.A.E. has staunchly backed American 
financial reform requests regarding misuse of the informal sector, namely hawala.  The 
U.A.E. has been hand in hand with the U.S. Treasury Department in the financial aspect 
of the “war on terror.” 
b. Registration 
The International conferences on Hawala have continued with one in 
2004, 2006, and 2007.  The themes have been consistent, though.  One of the first 
measures taken by the Central Bank of the U.A.E. was to begin registering hawaladars 
voluntarily.  Furthermore, the Central Bank has tried to solicit the information of the 
remitters and beneficiaries to keep in a central database.  Additionally, it has become a 
requirement for a hawaladar to report any suspicious transaction.  Government officials 
have tried to assure the hawaladars that their personal information will be kept securely 
with the Central Bank, but it remains unclear how reassuring these promises have been.  
Lastly, any transaction done through the Central Bank will require a certificate that will 
be issued to all hawaladars.175 
U.A.E. has aggressively engaged the hawala system in its country with 
far-reaching effects.  With continual anti-money laundering and hawala legislation, it has 
set itself apart as the leading hawala regulating country.  As a leading financial hub for 
the Middle East as well as the world, the second and third order effects of its regulations 
have hampered hawala systems throughout the world, but especially in the Middle East.  
While this thesis doesn’t focus on the U.A.E., it provides a snapshot over another 
perspective on hawala regulation.  U.A.E. regulation is much more aggressive than in 




175 Central Bank of the U.A.E., “Hawala Regulations in the U.A.E.”, 
http://www.centralbank.ae/AMLSU.php (accessed June 2007). 
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in mind, it seems a much less useful model for anti-terrorism financial measures in 
somewhere like Afghanistan, where often, there literally is no other alternative to hawala 
for the average person.  
c. The U.A.E. Hawala Threat: Applying The Four Variables From 
Afghanistan 
U.A.E. is different than Pakistan and Afghanistan.  One can find all four 
variables present, but with much different points of emphasis.  First, U.A.E. is also 
operating within an Islamic framework.  However, this paradigm is not necessarily as 
dominant as in Pakistan or Afghanistan.  The second variable, the formal financial sector, 
is so robust that this factor tends to be dominant along with the expatriate variable.  
Because of its close ties to the U.S. and its widespread regulatory efforts post-9/11, the 
formal financial sector and regulatory factor has dominated the hawala network in 
U.A.E.  The government has made significant efforts to stamp out or push aside hawala 
traffic in U.A.E. but as pointed out earlier, because of the plethora of reliable, readily 
available and westernized financial institutions, the ill effects of over-regulation have 
been mostly negligible.  Simply due to the sheer enormity of the financial epicenter in 
Dubai it seems clear that in this model hawala is definitely no strategic threat.  In the 
voluminous financial traffic that flows in and out of U.A.E. there are countless alternative 
means to conduct business ensuring that hawala remains largely on the periphery of the 
financial world.  Like Pakistan and Afghanistan, hawala is still culturally preferable, but 
the difference is that U.A.E. positively provides a superfluity of other options for 
remittances and financial transactions.  The last variable, drugs, is evident but is nowhere 
near the menacing frontier that it is in Pakistan or lawless Afghanistan.  By comparison, 
U.A.E. has a well-functioning government, enforced laws and regulations, and an 
educated population with a much higher financial acumen.  Though U.A.E.’s hawala 
system is starkly different than Afghanistan or Pakistan, it would be wise to approach it 
through the same four-variable framework. 
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D. FINAL THOUGHTS: POLICY CRITIQUES AND CULTURAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
The U.S. Treasury Department has totally failed to see social and cultural realities 
on the ground.  Ironically, after the fall of the Taliban, the Bush Administration found out 
the hard way that they had to rely on the same hawala network utilized by terrorists in 
order to move money in Afghanistan or to get anything done.  A little historical 
perspective can go a long way.  The complete cultural ignorance by the U.S. government 
to the importance of the hawala system in Afghan or Muslim society was completely 
avoidable.  There are numerous historical examples and colonial narratives that illustrate 
the deep meaning of hawala to the Afghan way of life.  This sort of improper framing of 
the issue has plagued U.S. foreign policy in the region and certainly its approach to 
hawala, too. 
“During the decades of conflict, trust in the government was progressively eroded 
and transposed to kinship, ethnic, and other social connections.”176  Afghans are 
ethnically aligned first and foremost, then they are Muslims, and last of all they consider 
themselves Afghan citizens. Once more, the gravitational pull of these ties is 
monumentally forceful.  These social and ethnic ties bind the Afghan people, not the 
central government.  It is in these contexts that the Afghan people want to conduct their 
business, not under the perceived interference of Kabul or the U.S. Treasury 
Department’s regulations.  
 
Afghanistan’s political economy is so deeply constituted through regional 
and international associations that it would be a mistake to view it in a 
purely national context.177  
 
 
Yet that is exactly what the U.S. has attempted to do through FATF regulations and DAB 
laws.   It is a serious blunder that ignores the rich cultural history of Afghanistan. 
 
176 Thompson, 157. 
177 Ibid., 170. 
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Hawala regulation also appears steep in “mirror imaging.”178  There seems to be 
a belief that universal regulation, blunt tools such as the PATRIOT ACT, EO 13224, or  
those offered in the FATF special recommendations are going to ubiquitously act as 
penicillin for the incongruities and faults of hawala networks throughout the world.  This 
is false and a disastrous cognitive pretext for reform. 
Perhaps the most important truth to glean from Afghanistan is the utter inefficacy 
of any reform that does not include the hawaladars themselves in the creative process.  
Due to the social constraints, business practices and history of self-regulation, it is 
imperative to have hawaladar support in any regulatory measures.  Less than full 
endorsement and collaboration in regulatory legislation or enforcement will doom any 
such measures to failure.  Trust must be earned.  However, the government can reach out 
to hawaladars over time, heeding their advice, and slowly nudging them to the formal 
sector incrementally.  Reform must slowly occur in formal financial sectors, but must 
also include financial education and literacy, and be accompanied by several iterations of 
corruption-free government.  Terrorist-free informal financing in Afghanistan will be a 
slow, collaborative effort led by the hawaladars as trust is formed with the central 
government and the legal frameworks of Afghanistan slowly garner legitimacy. It must 
take place within the context of Afghanistan, though. 
It is a mistake to over-regulate hawala, and to the extent that it must be regulated, 
the greatest cultural deftness must be employed.  If the U.S. is to curb Islamic 
“extremism” and jihadism in its “war on terror” than it absolutely cannot afford to 
continue offering an olive branch to moderate Muslims even as it wields a blunt and 
deadly financial hammer in the other hand. 
 
 
178 Samuel M. Maimbo (2005), 62. 
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